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Thesis Abstract 
Innovation is important to social progress and economic growth, for it ultimately 
realocates resources to achieve desired goals more eficiently or achieve an entirely new 
goal that  brings  value to  human life.  Accordingly,  significant  scholarship  has  been 
dedicated towards understanding drivers of innovation, which generaly focus on country-
level indicators, and recent literature also suggests corporate governance may also be 
important for innovation.  Governance  can  either  be  external,  when  out  of the 
organization’s  control  such  as  media  coverage,  or internal,  which  are  unique to  every 
organization,  such  as  ownership  structure  and  board  structure.   While  several  studies 
have examined the impacts of various internal governance mechanisms on innovation in 
single countries, research on conceptual relationships have been split, due to the wide 
variance of national institutions that influence governance. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact internal corporate governance 
mechanisms  have  on innovation.  This  study  examines relationships between internal 
governance mechanisms and innovation in the context of utility token oferings, which is 
an innovative method of entrepreneurial finance for organizations ofering a blockchain-
based application. This seting is interesting as there are no notable regulations that apply 
to utility token oferings as contracts are enforced through smart contracts, on blockchain. 
Further, it is able to test these relationships in a  smal to medium sized organizational 
context  of high-technology  start-ups,  which  usualy  have  advisory  boards,  whereby 
advisors provide external advice to the top management team, but do not have fiduciary 
duty as external directors would. This thesis thereby examines the impact of ownership 
structure and board structure, with respect to advisory boards, on innovation outputs. 
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The analyses were conducted on 525 utility tokens, which held their initial oferings 
within a period of three years. Several linear regressions were conducted, with the natural 
logarithm  of  pul requests  merged  as the  dependent  variable, representing innovation 
output. Independent variables of interest included elements of ownership concentration, 
specificaly the percentage of tokens owned by whales, refering to those who own 1% or 
more of a token’s supply, the number of institutional investors, and the percentage of the 
token  ofered to the  public;  and  elements  of  board  structure including the  number  of 
advisors and the technical intensity of advisors. To test potential quadratic relationships, 
the  squared terms  of  each independent  variable  was  also  considered.  Controling 
variables included disclosure of based country, implementation of a softcap and hardcap 
on  campaign fundraising  activities, the  number  of restricted  countries,  duration  of the 
campaign in days, and whether or not they had a pre-ICO ofering, ofered a minimaly 
viable product upon initial ofering or provided a bonus for purchasing a high volume.  
  Findings  suggest that  ownership  concentration, represented  by the  percentage 
owned by whales, has an inverse-U relationship on innovation output, which can be seen 
as rectifying the  may  positive  and  negative linear relationships in  prior research. 
Institutional  ownership  had  a  strong,  positive relationship  on innovation  output.  The 
percentage of the token supply ofered to the public had no significant relationship with 
innovation output, unlike research on utility token financial performance. The findings also 
cemented  predictions for  board  structure,  namely that the  percentage  of technical 
advisors explained more variance for innovation outcomes than the number of advisors, 
with the former a positive, linear relationship, and the later a mostly negative relationship. 
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There are several limitations of this study. In terms of its ability to represent the 
conceptual relationship  of innovation  and  governance, this  study is  constrained  as 
relationships  within  utility tokens  may  not represent the relationship  of firms  overal. 
Second, it limited itself to studying innovation outcomes and not innovation as a process, 
in line  with research that  examines  patent  activity  as  an innovation  outcome  within 
traditional firms.  Third,  utility token  holders  do  not  have  an  ownership  stake in the 
organization per-se like shareholders and boards studied were advisory boards, which 
unlike  boards  of  directors,  have  no fiduciary  duty. In terms  of its  application to  utility 
tokens, the study was limited to utility tokens which had a GitHub account, the results 
cannot be infered to be representative of al utility tokens. 
The findings  suggest that regulatory  authorities,  policy  makers  and investors 
should turn their atention to an inversed-U relationship between ownership concentration 
and innovation. Accordingly, exploring ways to limit excessive ownership concentration 
should be a feature of good governance and, in the utility token context, bonuses should 
not be ofered for volume discounts of tokens as such bonuses encourage innovation. Its 
findings of institutional investment suggest that investment by venture capital firms should 
be encouraged as it has a positive impact on innovation. Advisory boards appear to have 
similar relationships  on innovation  as  boards  of  directors in terms  of  size.  Technical 
intensity accounted for more variance, firms should encourage technical presence on teir 
advisory boards and boards of directors. 
No other research has examined the relationship of governance and innovation in 
the  context  of  utility tokens.  This research  bridges the  gap  and  provides  a  strong 
foundation for future research.  
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1.1. Context 
1.1.1. Situating the Research 
Innovation is important to social progress and economic growth (Romer, 1986), for 
it ultimately realocates resources to achieve desired goals more eficiently or achieve an 
entirely new goal that brings value to human life. Interestingly, prior to the early twentieth 
century, innovation had a negative connotation as it was associated with rebelion from 
the  mainstream  and  accepted  practices (Morck  and  Yeung,  2001).  The  modern 
understanding of innovation, as a valuable improvement to life, folowed the work of Josef 
Schumpeter (1939)  who  coined the term ‘creative  destruction’  as  a  process  where 
creative firms invent and market new technology, destroying markets for older technology 
in the  process.  As innovation  entails that  economies  can  be  more  eficient  and  strive 
towards  higher  goals, the  value  of innovation  outweighs the  cost  of the ‘destruction’ it 
incurs in terms  of  overal  productivity.  While  Schumpeter  broadly  defined innovation 
processes, Christensen, Craig and Hart (2001) added clarity by introducing two variations 
of innovation,  namely incremental innovations  which  achieve  existing  goals  with less 
resources, and disruptive innovations which alow individuals to achieve a new goal. A 
notable example of a disruptive innovation is how Ford was able to position vehicles as a 
means of achieving afordable transportation, disrupting the marketplace for horse and 
buggies. With vehicles, humans can not only achieve local transportation more eficiently 
than  horse  and  buggy,  but the  speed  of  vehicles  alowed for longer  destinations that 
ultimately created greater integration in society.  
Innovation has since become among the most important policy topics, as finance 
and strategic management scholars have recognized that innovation can provide firms 
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longer-term  competitive  advantage, (Weerawardena  and  Mavondo,  2011;  Di  Vito  and 
Laurin,  2010)  and  economists  have recognized that, through innovation,  countries  are 
able to achieve long-run sustainable growth (Ahlstrom, 2010; Romer, 1986). Firms which 
spend  heavily  on research  and  development  are found to  have  stronger  performance 
(Kostopoulos,  Papalexandris,  Papachroni  and Ioannou,  2011)  and  are  associated  with 
increased value (Johnson and Pazderka, 1993). Indeed, businesses flourish when they 
alocate scarce resources to accomplish objectives more eficiently than before. This also 
impacts  economies,  as  historical  economic research finds those  who  have  strongly 
fostered innovation, perhaps by accident, have also prospered greatly over time (Morck 
and Yeung, 2001). Behaviour supportive of creative destruction and disruptive innovation 
has been corelated wel to several indicators for quality of life (Gordon, 2018), including 
life expectancy, GDP per capita, human development and productivity. The increase in 
eficiency  alows  humans to  alocate  more time to  more  valuable tasks,  which is 
highlighted in the increasing knowledge-based economy. 
While innovation  provides first-mover  advantage  over  a  value  network to the 
innovative firm,  such  power is temporary  and  overal,  a  net  benefit for  consumers  and 
society. The contention for the centrality of innovation as critical to social progress violates 
a fundamental assumption of perfect competition in neoclassical economics (Makowski 
and Ostroy, 2001). This assumption infers that firms are prevented from raising the price 
beyond  covering for the imports,  competitive  salaries  and fair investor returns  as 
innovative firms can charge in excess for the value of the improvement they introduce. 
However, innovative firms are given first-mover advantage with their new invention; and 
this advantage generaly benefits consumers in the long run as it pushes more eficient 
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or efective organizations of resources (Fogel, Morck. and Yeung, 2008). Innovation to 
which the firm has a first-mover advantage would nonetheless need to compete with other 
innovations that  exist in  other  markets  and  need to  price  competitively to  gain  market 
share. A visible example can be seen with BlackBery, which once held the monopoly for 
handheld keyboard devices. Over time, it became disrupted with touch screen phones, 
and the company was forced to eventualy exit the business of celular devices altogether 
(Gans, 2016). It folows, thereby, that in the knowledge-based economy, competition is 
primarily around innovation, and not necessarily prices, as standard economics poses. 
Given the centricity of innovation to growth, wealth of firms, development of nations 
and social wel-being, researchers aim to identify mechanisms that boost innovation and 
distinguish these from hindering factors. Among the determinants explored are optimal 
subsidies, firm  size,  property rights,  demographics,  political regimes,  patent laws, 
regulations, and relative income equality to name a few (Morck and Yeung, 2001). While 
the  exploration  of  macro-level  determinants  of innovation  has  grown into  a large 
subdiscipline within economics; there are far fewer studies on micro-determinants due to 
a chalenge in available data (Gonzales-Bustos and Hernandez-Lara, 2016). 
1.1.2. Governance and Innovation Research 
While years of research point to relationships between governance quality and firm 
performance, only recently has research suggested it as a significant micro-determinant 
to innovation (Tylecote and Visintin, 2007). Literature in this area generaly explores how 
innovation  activity is influenced  by  external  governance  and the relationship  between 
such and the firms’ comprehension of innovation (Beloc, 2012). With an understanding 
of the  centrality  of innovation to  growth,  scholars  have recently  began  exploring the 
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relationship  between internal  governance  and innovation  by  exploring  a range  of 
mechanisms which aim to shrink agency costs between management and shareholders. 
Organizational  governance  mechanisms,  overal,  promote  alignment  between 
shareholders  and  managers  of  a  corporation,  such that  shareholders  can  be  assured 
against  opportunistic  managerial  behaviour.  With  separation  of  ownership  and  control, 
corporate governance has become increasingly important, especialy since the colapse 
of Enron, WireCard and Nortel to name a few. Governance can be largely be separated 
into internal governance, which are mechanisms for which the company has some control 
in aligning  such interests,  and  external  governance  which  are  mechanisms linked to 
markets in  a  broader  sense,  such  as  media treatment,  which  can  communicate 
misalignment (Dyck  Volchkova  and  Zingales,  2004). Internal  governance  measures 
oversee decisions taken by the firm regarding its performance and competitiveness and 
includes ownership structure, board structure, executive compensation and shareholder 
rights. Given their capacity to influence decisions, both, external and internal mechanisms 
are  shown to  provide incentives  or  disincentives for  managers to invest in long-term 
projects which impacts the ability of the firm to innovate. 
1.1.3. Key Problems 
With  substantial  diferences in  contextual  setings,  namely  diferences  between 
countries in investor protection (LaPorta et. al, 2006), and extralegal institutions (Dyck 
and Zingales, 2004) that, in turn, influence governance and innovation, theoretical and 
empirical arguments on internal governance and innovation remain inconclusive. Varying 
property right laws (Lacetera, 2001; Zhao, 2006; Tomizawa, Zhao), use of the Rule of 
Law (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Morck and Yeung, 2009), anit-democratic governments 
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(Morck  and  Steier,  2005;  Burton,  Filatotchev,  Chahine  and  Wright,  2010)  and  varying 
corporate  governance regulations (Ugur,  2013)  have  al  been  demonstrated to  efect 
innovation, and the efectiveness of governance mechanisms (Hoskisson, Hit, Johnson 
and  Grossman,  2000;  Basselier  and  Ahlstrom,  2020).  Major factors  of internal 
governance,  namely  ownership  structure  and institutional  ownership,  have  positive, 
negative  and insignificant relationships found (Gonzales-Bustos  and  Hernandez-Lara, 
2016). Mixed findings within this area suggest relationships of ownership concentration 
and institutional ownership on innovation are sensitive to national contexts where studies 
are conducted, and board structure for diferences in upholding fiduciary duties across 
nations. 
Research on the relationship between governance and innovation has also yet to 
be  explored in  a  contextual  seting  outside  of large,  publicly traded  corporations,  and 
controling for difering technical intensities of sectors. While boards of directors to larger 
corporations  have  been  subject to  significant research  some  variables remain to  be 
examined that may be more preeminent in smaler and medium-sized technology start-
ups.  Technology  start-ups  usualy  need to  atract investment,  while  also face  strong 
pressure to innovate in order for their firm to appreciate. Many private start-up firms, for 
instance,  utilize  advisory  boards instead  of recruiting independent  directors.  Advisory 
boards difer from boards of directors as there is no fiduciary duty and are usualy paid 
less  compensation,  when  compared  with formal independent  directors.  This  makes it 
atractive to advisors and start-ups seeking expert advice for their firm. According to a 
Deloite Canada survey (Osry, 2020), 86% of smal and medium sized businesses with 
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an  advisory  board in  Canada  said  such  made  a  significant  and  positive impact  on the 
organization’ success. 
A limited  number  of  studies  explore two-way  and  non-linear relationships, (De 
Miguel et. al., 2004) however these are limited to specific countries and mechanisms of 
governance.  Non-linear relationships  between  variables  have  yet to  be tested.  Sapra, 
Subramanian  and  Subramanian (2016)  developed  a theory  of the  efects  of  external 
corporate governance on innovation, by studying takeover pressure, and found evidence 
supporting  an inverse  U relationship instead  of  a linear relationship  as found  by  other 
research in  various  contexts.  This  quadratic form  of relationship  may  also  explain the 
contradictory findings  between  ownership  structure  and innovation,  with respect to 
ownership concentration, managerial ownership and institutional ownership, remains to 
be studied empiricaly. 
1.2. Thesis Objectives 
This research responds to the  key  chalenges to  studying relationship  between 
structures of internal governance and innovation activity, by doing so within the context 
of utility tokens. Through smart contracts, which are not enforced through country-level 
institutions  but rather through  blockchain,  such firms  are  subject to  only  very limited 
national regulation,  which  along  with  a  wealth  of  open-access  data,  makes them  an 
atractive laboratory to test  conceptual relationships.  Furthermore, these findings  may 
also be useful for their contextual seting as entrepreneurial firms, which like other high 
technology firms, seek investment and need to innovate to appreciate in value. 
In  particular, this thesis  aims to  determine the  shape,  direction  and  strength  of 
relationships between innovation activity of organizations financed through the issuance 
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of utility tokens and independent variables, such as the percentage of tokens owned by 
large token  holders,  number  of institutional  owners,  advisory  board  size  and technical 
intensity. This research can, therefore, give clarity to three interelated problems on the 
relationship of governance and innovation. 
First, it would alow to empiricaly testing on relationships of internal governance 
on innovation, namely with respect to ownership concentration, institutional ownership, 
and board structure, in a context of limited regulation. With limited national influences, 
studying such relationships in a context like utility tokens, are important for developing 
the  conceptual relationships.  Utility tokens  may  have  wide  variation in  ownership 
concentration, institutional ownership and board structure and are not governed by formal 
national institutions. Exploring non-linear relationships in this context can also be fruitful 
to truly identify the nature of the relationship and can potentialy reconcile positive and 
negative findings from other jurisdictions. 
Second, the  context  of  utility tokens  would  alow for research  on  smaler  high 
technology  start-ups,  where the impacts  of  ownership  concentration  and institutional 
ownership may be overlooked by potential owners. This would also alow for empirical 
study  of  advisory  boards  and their relationship to innovation,  as these  are  generaly 
prefered to independent directors among smal businesses for their lack of fiduciary duty 
of directors and less compensation necessary as a result. These prominent features of 
medium-sized business governance have yet to be subject to much empirical work due 
to lack  of  data.  With  a lack  of  data, it remains to  be  empiricaly tested  weather  or  not 
advisory boards have similar impacts on innovation to boards of directors. As most utility 
tokens have advisory boards, this provides a useful context to understand such boards 
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and their relations to innovation.  Further,  many findings  between  board  structure  and 
innovation  also remain inconclusive  due to  a  wide range  of innovation  proxies  and 
contextual setings to studies. Innovation activity from some utility tokens can be tracked 
with  open  source  code repositories,  which  alongside the lack  of formal regulations 
applying to advisory boards of these blockchain-based organizations, characteristics of 
advisory  boards to  utility tokens  may  also  provide  some fruitfulness to  advance 
understanding the  overal  conceptual relationship  between  board  structure  and 
innovation. 
Third,  as  ownership  structure  and  board  structure  are the two  major factors  of 
internal governance, such research alows for development of a holistic theory of internal 
governance  on innovation.  To  date,  most research  operationalize  governance  as  only 
one its  major  mechanisms,  such  as  ownership  concentration,  ownership  structure  or 
board  structure  and  do  not  explore  non-linear relationships.  Exploring  ownership 
concentration and board structure a part of a single, conceptual framework that accounts 
for potential  non-linear interaction  on innovation is important.  With  many  difering 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of innovation, this thesis can also study these 
governance mechanisms against the same measure of innovation, and among the same 
sample  of firms that  mitigate national influences,  being in the  context  of  utility tokens. 
Altogether, this research  aims to  bring  empirical  clarity  on these three interelated 
problems with insight from a unique, empirical seting. 
1.3. Research Seting 
This research is set within the empirical laboratory of utility tokens. Utility tokens 
are licenses to use applications on a distributed ledger, for which these applications are 
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made by individual organizations. The diference between application on a utility token 
and software, is its base on a distributed ledger. A distributed ledger is a database, caled 
a ledger, that is  distributed  across  a  network  of  several  machines  with  no  central 
administrator. These machines power popular BitCoin, Etereum and FileCoin, and utility 
tokens aim to use these machines to solve problems for a wide range of sectors, similar 
to software. Proponents issue tokens to those who buy them, which represents a license 
to  use the technology  eventualy  developed,  and there  are  usualy  a fixed  supply  of 
available licenses.  
Utility tokens begin with an initial coin ofering (ICO), which are a type of fundraising 
method for  a  start-up  using  blockchain. ICOs  use the  decentralized feature  of ‘smart 
contracts’ to create an agreement between investors and entrepreneurs. There are two 
major forms of ICOs, namely security token oferings (STOs) and utility token oferings 
(UTOs). Whereas security tokens are digitalized securities and can largely be thought of 
as investments as token holders become investors in the organization, utility tokens are 
licenses to their technology.  During  a  UTO  campaign, investors  purchase tokens  at  a 
predefined price by a specified end date, directly from the utility token, in order to provide 
early stage financing available directly and immediately (Fisch, 2019). The funds raised 
from the UTO are to finance technological development of the utility token. As tokens are 
only sold by the organization at the point of UTO, these token holders can then sel their 
tokens  on  an  exchange  and  can  be traded to  other investors  or  end  users  who  are 
interested in the technology the token  provides,  once  developed.  Hence,  some token 
holders who purchase tokens during the UTO phase may want the token to appreciate in 
value such that it can then be sold on an exchange, at a later date, for a higher price to 
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either investors or end consumers. While usualy issuing most of the tokens for sale to 
the public, utility token founders also retain some tokens for their own purposes to reward 
themselves on development (Chen, 2017). 
While  most  security laws  apply to  security token  oferings (Mendelson,  2019), 
similar to traditional initial public oferings (IPOs) on the stock market, utility tokens are 
not  subject to  any  notable regulation (Crosser,  2018).  This is  because  UTOs  as they 
resemble ‘corporate coupons’ often found in traditional crowdfunding campaigns where 
investors do not atain dividends, but instead gain a discount on the product or service 
the  company  ofers.  An  example  of  a traditional  utility token  would  be Filecoin,  which 
raised $257 milion in token sales, in return for granting funders access to decentralized 
cloud  storage. Interestingly, research reveals that investors in  utility tokens  generaly 
hope that their tokens appreciate in value in a manner similar to security tokens (Crosser, 
2018), and that token issuers describe their oferings as utility tokens to avoid atracting 
regulations imposed on security tokens. As utility tokens are not classified as securities, 
most ICOs take the form of a utility token to avoid heavy regulation, despite investors of 
both desiring ultimately for the token to appreciate in value and treat their ICO holdings 
as investments. Hence, both security tokens and utility tokens act as a medium of value 
exchange and investment. Holders of security tokens look for dividends, and utility token 
holders hope that the organization develops and innovates its ofering, and in doing so 
appreciate the value of the token, which they could then sel in a secondary market at a 
higher price. As UTOs are unregulated and therefore information asymmetry is heavier 
as proponents and promotors to not disclose at al, or disclose only iregularly, information 
about their platform (Kaal, 2018). 
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To put ICOs in context, their rise in popularity in 2017 led them to achieve over 
$30  bilion in  aggregate trading  activity  between  2017  and  2019 (Price  Waterhouse 
Coopers,  2020); though  have  declined  significantly throughout  2019  as  security token 
oferings (STOs) gained in relative popularity compared to utility token initial coin oferings 
due to their greater regulation providing more confidence to investors. Nonetheless, the 
strong activity of utility token ICOs from 2017 to present provides a wealth of investor data 
that  could  provide  useful insights into the  broader  phenomena  and  within initial  coin 
ofering governance itself. 
Altogether,  utility tokens  provide  a fruitful laboratory to test the relationship 
between  governance  and innovation  due to their light regulation  and limited  external 
influence over their governance and innovation activity. Although many legal scholars cal 
for stricter regulations, and despite recent changes in the US in Fal 2019 (SEC, 2019), 
utility tokens remain  very lightly regulated  worldwide  and  hence  have limited formal 
institutions influencing governance. While diferent social structures impact investor and 
firm  behaviour in  diferent  countries (La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and  Vishny, 
2000), investor  behaviour  does  not influence  external  governance  structures  of  utility 
tokens. Internal  governance  of  utility tokens is  voluntary,  as  each  ofering  only  adopts 
those governance mechanisms necessary to convince investors the organization’s token 
ofering is worth funding and is safe (Johnson and Yi, 2019). 
Research from  EY (2018)  shows just  under  50%  of ICOs  were  successful in 
fundraising, a mere 16% have a prototype, 13% have a working product, 86% are below 
their listing price within a year, and 30% lose almost al value. Hence, the wide variation 
yet great importance of both, innovation activity and governance standards, along with 
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limited regulation  and formal  country-level institutions influencing  governance,  present 
utility tokens as an idealy laboratory to test the relationship of governance and innovation 
in a global context that measures innovation activity consistently and encompasses al 
major aspects of internal organizational governance. Recent data also shows that a mere 
44% of ICOs survive after four months (Benedeti and Kostovetsky, 2018). 
Governance of utility tokens is diferent from that of traditional firms. In the case of 
utility tokens, founders are generaly 100% owners of their organization and, instead of 
seling shares, sel tokens instead of shares on an ‘crypto exchange’. Accordingly, token 
holders,  who  purchase tokens,  have  similar interests to  shareholders  as they  are 
financing a venture to gain a future profit with appreciation of the business, or in this case 
technology, within the traditional agency theory model.  
1.4. Motivation 
This research is primarily motivated by the need to beter theorize the conceptual 
relationships  of internal  governance  mechanism  on innovation  and  empiricaly  explore 
such.  Research on the relationship between governance and innovation has yet to be 
explored in a contextual seting that mitigates influence from country-level regulations and 
institutions that influence  governance,  and  also in  contexts  outside  of large,  publicly 
traded corporations. Additionaly, relationships between key components of governance 
structure,  such  as  ownership  concentration, institutional  ownership,  management 
ownership  and  board  structure,  have  yet to  be  extensively tested for  non-linear 
relationships, which may explain the mixed findings studied in various national contexts. 
Therefore, the true  conceptual relationship  between internal  governance 
mechanisms, namely ownership structure and board structure, remains to be found. A 
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conceptual  understanding  would  be important to  guide future  scholarship  as it  would 
clarify the interaction of several internal governance mechanisms and innovation activity, 
and potentialy pave the way for future scholarship to identify external and national-level 
factors that influence innovation. Major reasons underpinning the inconclusiveness are 
the difering technical intensities of individual sectors and legal diferences surounding 
the obligations of boards of directors in diferent countries. Controling for these factors 
requires a significant sample size of firms within a specific industry and within a specific 
country with accessible data on innovation and governance, which the utility token context 
provides. 
Second, this research is  motivated to respond to the  need for  governance  and 
innovation scholarship within the area of high-technology start-ups. These organizations 
often  seek  outside investment  and face  similar  governance  decisions to  major 
corporations  yet  have  some  diferences.  These firms  need to innovate for firm 
appreciation,  and  may  use  advisory  boards  over independent  directors.  Given their 
significance to  economic  growth,  yet  also recognizing  wel-known failure rates  of  such 
firms, examining governance within such context can be important for improving practices 
and  hence for  beter investment  decisions.  Altogether, regulatory  authorities, investors 
and  policy  makers  seeking  economic  growth through  strong  governance  design in 
developed and developing nations, would benefit from research addressing governance 
and innovation at a conceptual level and within a technology start-up context. 
Third, this research also aims to contribute meaningfuly to the debate of regulating 
utility tokens and UTOs. The SEC’s Investor Alerts and Buletins (2019) argues that ICOs 
may  serve  as fair  and lawful investment  opportunities  but  warns that  scammers  could 
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exploit these new technologies and financial products associated with ICOs to improperly 
entice investors with the promise of high returns. In response, some research suggests 
regulatory authorities need to beter regulate governance of utility token ICOs to protect 
investors (Howel, Niessner and Yermack, 2019) while others suggest it may defeat its 
disruptive  potential (Johnson  and  Yi,  2019).  Accordingly, regulatory  authorities  would 
need to  understand the  optimal level  of  external  governance that  would  best  promote 
innovation, should they decide to implement regulations surounding utility token ICOs to 
protect investors. Potential utility token holders also should understand how governance 
impacts their potential return through innovation activity to optimize the use of their funds 
and potential return. 
Curent research  examining relationships  between  governance  mechanisms in 
initial coin oferings remains extremely limited however may be crucial to understanding 
drivers  of  appreciation in  value, through innovation.  To  date,  no  study in initial  coin 
oferings  accounts for  ownership  structure,  which  given its influence  on IPO literature, 
may be a fruitful area of future research. Further, most studies within this context examine 
governance  on fundraising  success,  however  with  40%  of  new  ventures financed  and 
only  4%  developing  working technology, this is  not  necessarily  corelating  with 
appreciation in intrinsic value of the token ofering, a  major motivation of most investors. 
Studies examining governance also usualy do so using a wide range of proxy measures, 
which usualy measure innovation inputs or throughputs, and hence this variation may 
lead to significant problems in measuring results accurately. 
Studies  examining  governance in the ICO  context  also  usualy  do  so  without  a 
theoretical foundation of governance literature, and hence fail to account for factors such 
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as identity of large shareholders. As Fish and Momtaz (2020) empiricaly show, ownership 
structure  could  be  a  critical  area that impacts  performance.  Accordingly, investigating 
other  variables  of  ownership  structure  would  be important,  along  with  other internal 
governance mechanisms. This research would provide a model that uses many proxies 
colectively forming strength in internal governance mechanisms, on real outcomes for 
ICOs, namely through innovation. 
1.5. Limitations 
The research is limited to  utility tokens,  which  have  diferent  organizational 
structures to traditional firms which may limit the external validity of the study results to 
other forms of entrepreneurial finance. In a utility token, firms promise development of 
technology using blockchain through seling a token, which may appreciate in value and 
be either sold in a secondary market or kept for its utility to a token holder. Traditional 
firms sel shares of a to investors in public markets, who then gain an equity stake in the 
firm, and many times, earn a dividend. As the firm establishes, their shares appreciate in 
value and can be sold in the market. In a utility token, the firm is held by its individual 
investors and generaly, its founders. Investors purchase tokens for appreciation of value, 
similar to the use of shares in a traditional firm, however investors do not get ownership 
right in the context of utility token. Further, utility tokens generaly prefer use of advisors 
over independent directors, which while stil seeking external opinions, the former are not 
bound by a fiduciary duty as the later. This is similar to other high-technology start-up 
firms. Although there are also many striking similarities, potential results should be taken 
with some caution when extrapolating results to traditional firms in a traditional context.  
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1.6. Organization of the Study 
This  study  proceeds in  six further  chapters.  The  proceeding  chapter  provides  a 
review of literature pertaining to both, works surounding the relationship of governance 
and innovation and the study of governance and innovation within the context of initial 
coin  oferings.  Within this  chapter,  propositions  are  drawn from the literature,  at  a 
conceptual level. In Chapter II, a detailed discussion of sources and colection of primary 
and secondary data and a methodology for analyzing such data is outlined. A model is 
presented  with  hypotheses in  Chapter IV,  which  draws  on findings from the literature 
within the  empirical  seting.  The  empirical  analysis  and results  are then  presented in 
Chapter V, complete with relevant tables. A discussion of the results is then folowed, with 
implications for methodology, theory and practice and limitations within Chapter VI. Lastly, 
Chapter  VI  sums  up the thesis  as  a  conclusion  with recommendations for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
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While there is a wealth of research on corporate governance and its relationship 
to financial performance, research on governance and innovation is comparatively much 
smaler  and is inconclusive  yet increasing in importance  with the  growing  knowledge 
intensity of the economy. Governance, through its provision of ownership structure, and 
the structure  of the  board  of  directors,  guides  decision  making,  power  and  authority 
between  corporate  management  bodies (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976).  Accordingly, 
governance can provide incentives to management to invest resources towards research 
and development. As firms vary widely on their governance structures, governance may 
be  a  significant  micro-determinant to innovation (Tylecote  and  Visintin,  2007)  and  can 
explain  why firms facing  similar  external  conditions  could  have  diferent  outcomes  on 
innovativeness. External governance mechanisms, such as market for corporate control 
has  been  studied rigorously,  namely  with  Sapra,  Subramanian  and  Subramanaian’s 
(2007) finding  of  an inverted-U  between takeover  pressure  and innovation.  However, 
research  between internal  governance  mechanisms  and innovation remains 
understudied.  Accordingly, this  chapter reviews literature  on the relationship  between 
internal governance mechanisms and innovation, and ofers propositions based on the 
reviewed literature, throughout.   
2.1.2. Efect from Ownership Concentration 
 
Positive  and  negative relationships  have  been found  within  empirical literature 
studying ownership concentration on innovation in a range of setings. With potential to 
greatly influence  management,  ownership  concentration is  an important internal 
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governance  mechanism, refering to the  concentration  of  shares  a  specific investor  or 
subset  of investors,  within  an  organization.  Positive relationships  between  ownership 
concentration and innovation activity have been found in the United States (Baysinger, 
Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Lacetera, 2001) and Europe (Munari, Oriani and Sobrero, 2010); 
whereas negative relationships have been found within the contexts of Canada (Di Vito, 
Laurin and Bozec, 2010), China (Chen, Li, Shapiro and Zhang, 2010) Italy (Bataggion 
and Tojoli, 2000), Switzerland (Brunninge, Nordqvist and Wiklund, 2007) and Germany 
(Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2009) among others. 
Studies showing positive relationships principaly suggest larger shareholders are 
most concerned with the market value of the firm, and therefore, become more inclined 
to invest in long-term investments that  wil  generate  value (Beloc,  2012).  Seeking to 
atract more shareholders and gain exponential return in the long run instead of individual 
profit in the short-run, firms with concentrated ownership are positioned to increase firm 
stability in order to do so. As innovation increases firm stability, as shown in Lee, (2005) 
larger shareholders would influence management to invest in innovation activities. 
Those finding  a  negative relationship  generaly  suggest that  as  ownership 
concentration increases, large  shareholders influence the  company to  maximize their 
personal  and  private  short-run  profit (Su,  Xu  and  Phan,  2008),  and  become  more risk 
averse,  which  minimizes long-term innovation  projects.   Using  agency theory  as a 
framework, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1999) and Denison and Mishra (1995) suggest that 
owners  become increasingly  more risk  averse  with the  greater  concentration  of their 
shares tied within one firm and hence desire more conservatism. As innovation is a risky 
activity that may only pay in the long term, firms with higher ownership concentration are 
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also said to participate in less strategic renewal, and hence are less innovative (Hil and 
Snel, 1988). 
There  may  be  several  explanations for  diferences  between jurisdictions  on 
ownership concentration and innovation; and many cross-country studies conclude that 
results are largely variable depending on nations studied. Property rights, the Rule of Law 
democracy,  governance regulations,  socio-economic  mobility,  protectionism, freedom 
from the press, and freedom of expression have al been wel documented as relating to 
innovation  processes (Khanna  and  Palepu,  2000;  Hoskisson,  Hit,  Johnson  and 
Grossman, 2000; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005, Carson, 2008) and corporate governance 
efectiveness (Morck, 2007). As these vary widely across countries and are hard to model, 
research remains inconclusive  as  a result.  Lee  and  O’Neil (2003)  studied  ownership 
concentration on research and development expenditure, finding a positive relationship 
for the US yet one insignificant for Japan. In a study of France, Germany and Italy with 
largely  concentrated  ownership  and the  US  and  UK  with largely  dispersed  ownership, 
Hal and Oriani (2006) interestingly find that for al countries except Italy and France was 
investment in research related to market value. However, this did hold true for firms in 
Italy and France who did not have high levels of concentrated ownership. Countries vary 
widely on legal protection for minority shareholders (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton and 
Jiang, 2008), and on pressure from external investors for disclosure and strategic renewal 
(Carney,  2005), implying limitations  on  examining the  causality  of  ownership 
concentration  on innovation.  Further,  causality is  also limited in  most  studies for their 
exclusion of other governance mechanisms which may arise concerns of endogeneity. 
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Some  studies  examine inverse  U-shape relationships in  areas  such  as  China 
(Chen,  Li,  Shapiro  and  Zhang,  2013).   Although China  has  very  weak institutions  of 
governance, these findings  may  pave the  way for  a  broader  conceptual relationship. 
Indeed,  an inverse  U  shape relationship  can reconcile  existing  positive  and  negative 
findings, which is to say that, to a particular point of concentration, firm aims to strengthen 
their market value for appreciation and ensure funds are going to their optimal use, yet 
past a point, owners become entrenched and expropriate resources for personal benefit 
which diminishes innovation activity. 
Proposition 1: Ownership concentration and innovation are related in the 
form of an inverse-U. 
2.1.2. Efect from Ownership Identity 
Major  shareholder identities  may influence the results found  within  studies  of 
ownership concentration and innovation. Research on institutional ownership, has been 
very mixed and largely dependent upon the preferences of institutions within particular 
geographies.  Positive  arguments  suggest institutional  owners  are  beter  enabled to 
achieve economies of scale, as they have tolerance for long-term investment (David and 
Kochar, 1996) and a supervisory ability that provides needed oversight to ensure funds 
are  alocated to innovative investments that  have reasonable  prospects  of  success 
(Aghion, Baccheta, Ranciere and Rogof, 2009; Choi, Lee and Wiliams, 2011). However, 
other  evidence  suggests  a  negative relationship  as  such institutional  ownership  drives 
takeover pressure, and the pressure from institutional investors to managers for reporting 
short-term profits, lowers their liking to long-term investments (Turk, 1992). 
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Family ownership (Bozec and Di Vito, 2019, Block, 2012, Latham and Braun, 2009; 
Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004) has been subject to a plethora of research, for which suggests 
several potential moderators to the relationship between innovation and governance. In 
particular, firms that  are  controled  by families  or  decedents,  aside from those  which 
began with a lone founder, are shown to innovate less. The potential underlying reason 
for such is that lone founders are passionate about their ofering while hiers and other 
family members wish to be risk averse and protect the capital accumulated (Su and Lee, 
2008; Di Vito, Laurin and Bozec, 2010). In a study of 303 TSX listed firms controled by 
their founders or their heirs, Bozec and Di Vito (2018) find that only lone founder firms, 
without  excess  voting rights,  have the  wilingness  and  ability to invest in research  and 
development, and hence invest more than their counterparts in such activities. As some 
countries have a larger percentage of controling shareholders being families or heirs, this 
may impact the results in some countries. For example, “the Canadian disease” refers to 
Canada’s  heavy  percentage  of families  controling its  major  corporations (Morck, 
Strangeland and Yeung, 2000) and may explain why ownership concentration was found 
negatively  corelated  with innovation in  such  countries,  whereas it  was  positive in the 
neighbouring United States. 
Bank  ownership is  popular in  many  developed  countries,  where  banks  are the 
larger  shareholders.  Bank  ownership  has  been  argued to  be  mostly  negative on 
investment in research  and  development, (Xiao  and  Zhao,  2012;  Tribo,  Berone  and 
Suroca,  2007)  as  banks  prefer to  minimize  uncertainty  on their investments  hence 
leading to lower levels of innovation. State ownership, also popular in many developing 
countries, is generaly found to also be either negative or insignificant on investment for 
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research  and  development (Munari,  Oriani  and  Sobrero,  2010;  Zhao,  Gao  and  Zhao, 
2017). 
While  studies  of  bank,  government  and family  ownership  on innovation leans 
towards a negative relationship, overal research of institutional ownership is shown to be 
positive. In some countries, institutional owners could be weighted more towards bank 
ownership  and  government  ownership,  such  as in  China (Shapiro,  Tang,  Wang  and 
Zhang, 2015) or families, such as in Canada (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeuing, 2005) which 
may impact aggregated findings with institutional ownership. It is thereby conceivable that 
expectations would be more related to specific identities, such as regulated banks and 
governments who may have more short-term expectations given their generaly transient 
investment behaviour for investing with expectations for short-term profit (Bushee, 2001). 
As aggregated studies examining institutional ownership would include owners of each 
of  varying identities,  an  understanding for  how  venture funds  behave remains to  be 
isolated. Institutional ownership with respect to venture funds, can thereby be argued as 
positive, given the due diligence towards investments and general commitment within the 
medium term. 
Proposition  2: Institutional  ownership  of  venture funds  have  a  positive 
relationship to innovation. 
2.1.3. Efect from Management Ownership 
Research on management ownership is rather limited though generaly suggesting 
a  positive relationship.  Studies finding  a  positive relationship  claim that  management 
ownership reduces  agency  costs  as  managers  have  greater  voting  power  which 
guarantees job stability to reduce risk aversion (Hil and Snel, 1988). Latham and Braun 
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(2009) find that, as management ownership increases, so too does the likelihood to take 
decisions that  maximize  shareholder  profit  which includes investments in innovative 
projects. Francis and Smith (1995) suggest firms with high managerial ownership, namely 
30% or more of ownership shares, are more innovative than those with widely held stock. 
Indeed, studies comparing shareholding ratios of management to R&D intensity report a 
strong  positive  corelation (Hosono,  Tomiyama  and  Miyagawa,  2004;  Aghiton,  van 
Reenan and Zigales, 2009). Lerner and Wulf (2007) show firms with centralized research 
and  development teams  who  are  given  with  stock  options,  also  corelate  with  patent 
citation, awards for innovation and patents of greater originality. Management ownership 
therefore has strong potential to be used as a tool that promotes alignment of interests 
between management and owners and this could result in greater innovation. 
Studies examining the broader phenomena of managerial ownership and financial 
performance,  however,  have  mostly  discovered  non-linear relationships (Morck, 
Wolfenzon  and  Yeuing,  2005;  Shleifer  and  Vishney,  1997,  Adams,  Hermalin  and 
Weisbach,  2010),  which imply that  when  managers face  a  strong  potential loss  of 
compensation or job security, they become more risk averse leading to less investment 
in innovation. Empirical research on entrenchment and innovations shows entrenchment 
ofsets incentives for innovation beyond a certain point, implying that high concentration, 
managerial  ownership  or institutional  ownership  wil  negatively  afect  performance 
beyond the point of inflection. Corelating management ownership and Tobin’s Q, a ratio 
between a firm’s market value and their asset replacement cost, most find inflection points 
of  an inverse-U relationship  between  35%  and  65% (McConel  and  Servaes,  1990; 
Gugler, Mueler and Yurtoglu, 2008). Based on a sample of British SMEs, Cosh, Fu and 
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Hughes (2007) demonstrate that CEO ownership positively efects innovation eficiency 
at low levels until peaking between 65% to 68%, when it then becomes negative. 
Inverse-U relationships  have  been tested  between  managerial  ownership  and 
research  and  development  expenditure (Beyer,  Czarnitzki  and  Kraft,  2012),  amoung 
Belgian firms. Hence, to a particular point, managers are more interested in increasing 
market value of their firm and puting resources towards innovation for such appreciation, 
yet beyond such point, become entrenched and use firm resources for personal benefit 
leading to less innovation. 
2.1.4. Efect from Controls and Incentives 
Surprisingly, litle atention has been paid to the role of incentives, such as CEO 
compensation  structure,  on innovation  activities; though studies  are  generaly in 
congruence  with respect to  managerial incentives and innovation.  Most theoretical 
arguments (Carpenter,  2000;  Lewelen,  2006)  draw  on  agency theory,  which  suggest 
managers  may  under-invest in innovation  activities  due the  high  probability  of failure 
(Holstrom and Tirole, 1989) which would reduce compensation and potentialy lead to job 
loss (Zwiebel,  1995).  However, there is  also  some incentive for  management to  over 
invest in innovation  given  potential for firm  growth  which  may lead to  higher 
compensation,  power  and  prestige (Baker,  Jensen  and  Murphy,  1988).  Empirical 
literature generaly finds positive relationships between value of incentives and innovation 
(Genus  and  Coles,  2006;  Lerner  and  Wulf,  2007).  Manso (2011)  analyzed  optimal 
incentive  schemes to  motivate innovation;  and found that those rewarding long-term 
success  and  having  high tolerance for  early failure  are  best.  Incentive  schemes  have 
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also been analyzed (Chow and Liu, 2007; Kim, Li and Zhang, 2011) with similar results 
found. 
2.1.5. Efect from Board Structure 
The structure  of  boards  of  directors, through their role  as the  ultimate  decision 
making authority in the firm and formal linkage between owners and managers (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) has been suggested to have strong linkage to strategy, and hence 
innovation activity, despite limited evidence (Balsmeir, Buchwald and Stiebale, 2014) and 
many potential factors efecting such relationships. Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk’s (1991) 
analysis  of  board  characteristics  on innovation,  concluded  with finding  a relationship 
between the  number  of internal  board  members  and research  and  development 
expenditure  per  employee.  Since then, literature  has  shown  a  number  of  other 
characteristics influencing innovation activities, including their size (Guest, 2009; Driver 
and Guedes, 2012), educational level of directors (Gang, Zezhong, Travlos and Hong, 
2007)  composition (Balsmeir,  Buchwald  and  Stiebale,  2014),  meeting frequency 
(Wincent, Anokhin and Ortqvist, 2010) and CEO duality (Lhuilery, 2011). 
Empirical literature  on the relationship  between  board  size  and innovation is 
relatively  mixed  yet leans towards  a  negative relationship.  Research finding  a  positive 
relationship generaly draw from the perspective that each additional director wil increase 
the human capital resources, such as experience, information and advice, to which the 
company can use. Accordingly, conceptualy, it is suggested that larger boards have a 
stronger capacity to deal with uncertainty in the external environment (Pfefer and Slancik, 
2003;  Jackling  and  Johl,  2009)  by  ofering  of  more  external financial  and technical 
resources than would otherwise be available, and are essential for innovation (Shapiro, 
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Tang,  Wang  and  Zhang,  2015).  Conceptualy, this  would  enhance the  success  of 
research and development projects which would increases firm value through innovation 
(Goodstein,  Gautam  and  Boeker,  1994;  Yermack,  1996;  Haynes  and  Hilman,  2010). 
Recognizing that, along with a greater size comes greater diversity of opinions, which at 
some point, may lead to conflict and mistrust, several empirical studies find a negative 
relationship between board size and innovation that examine other board characteristics 
(Zona, Zatoni, Minichili, 2009; Ruigrock, Peck, and Keler, 2006; Goodstein, Gautam and 
Boeker, 1994). This infers that other board characteristics may be more important than 
board size. Interestingly, some scholars such as Shaprio, Tang, Wang and Zhang (2015) 
do not find a significant impact on number of new patents. Similarly, Driver and Guedes 
(2012)  also  does  not find  any  significance  between  board  size  and research  and 
development expenditure. These insignificant studies may be due the contexts they were 
studied in, with weak institutions and more coruption in emerging markets having been 
suggested by several scholars, as accounting for the variance. 
Human  capital  of  directors, through individual  educational  atainment  and 
experiences, are important dimensions of the relationship between board strength and 
innovation in firms. Educational atainment determines directors’ cognitive complexities 
(Waly and Baum, 1994) which can alow for greater comprehension of new ideas and 
possibilities  by the  board  overal.  Educational level is  also  an important  dimension to 
adoption  of  new  behaviour,  ability to  define  problems  and  creatively ideate  solutions 
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989). As shown within the governance context, higher educational 
atainment of directors increases innovation processes and understandings, strengthens 
external analysis and corelates to greater implementation of innovation (Lacetera, 2001). 
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Hence, educational atainment, is an important dimension to board quality and the ability 
of the board to positively contribute to firm innovation. 
Ataining a balance between internal directors with deep product knowledge and 
external directors with diverse experiences, is important to achieve innovation outcomes. 
External directors, who bring senior experience from other organizations to the table, are 
shown to  positively  contribute to  strategic  change  within  a firm  and  beter  supervise 
management, that together fosters innovation (Brunninge, Nordqvist and Wiklund, 2007; 
Shapiro, Tang, Wang and Zhang, 2015). In studying external directors with engineering 
leadership experience on patent applications for German firms, Balsmeir, Buchwald and 
Stiebale (2014) finds  a  positive  corelation.  Colectively,  external  directors  are  able to 
bring their  human  capital resources to reduce  agency  conflicts  by  enhancing  conflict 
resolution and independently evaluating agendas (Yoo and Sung, 2015). 
Internal directors are more likely to adopt strategies for new product and service 
innovation if they have deep knowledge of the firms’ products or services. This detailed 
knowledge alows them to perceive less uncertainty and risk (Hoskinson, Hit, Johnson 
and  Grossman,  2002).  Being less  dependent  upon the  options  of  external  directors, 
Baysinger,  Kosnik  and  Turk (1991)  senior  executives  on the  board  positively linked to 
investment in risky projects, however only if not penalized for poor returns (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1989). Accordingly, board quality would be enhanced with a balance between 
external  directors  who  bring  extensive industry  experience  and internal  directors  who 
understand the services or products. 
More frequent meetings are likely to result in a more eficient (Vafeas, 1999) and 
efective board (Chiang and He, 2010), being a facilitator to time devotion from directors, 
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on firm strategy and supervision of management. Both functions are very important for 
alocating  scarce resources (Forbes  and  Miliken,  1999) to  build  on  opportunities  and 
address threats in the external environment, increasing potential resources for innovation 
(Hsu,  Lien  and  Chen,  2009).  Board  meetings,  as  a facilitator to  discussing  strategic 
alternatives, alows the firm to also reduce uncertainty and lead to stronger integration of 
activities that promote innovation (Wincent, Anokhin and Ortqvist).  
Mixed results  are found  on  whether  or  not  duality  negatively  or  positively 
contributes to innovation processes. Duality refers to situations where the Chair of the 
Board and the CEO are held by the same person (Fama and Jensen, 1983). There is 
some  empirical research  suggesting  duality  promotes innovation  by  ensuring  greater 
strategic integration  between the  board  and  management. In  a  study  of  duality  on 
research and development budgets among firms in France, Lhuilery (2011) concludes 
with results suggesting a positive and strong relationship. This work has been repeated 
in the  UK (Driver  and  Guedes,  2012)  with  similar findings.  Nonetheless, there is  also 
studies pointing to firms with duality alow for agency problems to arise due to information 
asymmetry between management and the board. Evidence supports duality leading to 
unfavourable shareholder returns and unfavourable stakeholder expectations (Petra and 
Dorata, 2008). Further, empirical research also shows separation between the Chair and 
President  would increase  decisions to invest in  projects  with long-term  potential (De 
Viliers,  Naiker  and  van  Staden,  2011)  and increase  monitoring  capacity  of innovation 
activities  by the  CEO (Crossland  and  Hambrick,  2007).  Accordingly,  while  duality  may 
lead to greater investment in research and development, a lower degree of success from 
those projects may also folow. 
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With the mixed findings of governance and innovation, it is likely that board quality 
is more important than board size for innovation. Conceptualy board size is only positive 
due to the greater resources of board members each add to the table and diversity of 
their opinions; otherwise it would be negative due to disagreement on direction and lack 
of  coordination.  Research  on  board  structure that  considers  other  characteristics than 
size,  generaly find  negative relationships  of  board  size (Zona,  Zatoni  and  Minichili, 
2013). This is interesting as most studies focus on size as the only variable. 
Insight on board size is mixed, yet there is a clear relationship with more internal 
technical  directors  driving innovation.  This infers that the  clear  driving force  behind 
governance and innovation is its technical intensity. Having a greater portion of directors 
from technical backgrounds wil alow directors to beter evaluate strategic decisions, and 
do  so  more  confidently,  when involving technology  and thereby  make  strengthening 
investment in innovation. 
Only  practitioner  studies  have  studied  advisory  boards,  which  do  not  cary  a 
fiduciary duty onto the advisors yet stil serve the purpose of providing external advice. In 
particular, these  are  highly  popular  with  privately-held technology firms.  Practitioner 
evidence suggests advisory boards can enhance innovation through providing advice to 
managers. In a Deloite survey, 86% of Canadian medium-sized businesses suggest. It 
had a positive impact on their organization and 25% of these businesses experienced 
20% sales growth, compared to 11% sales growth without advisory boards (Osry, 2020). 
While advisory boards may be positive, such would be conceptualy driven by the quality 
of advice they provide and hence be driven by technical intensity of the advisory board. 
Research Board size and innovation overwhelmingly points to a negative relationship, as 
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compromise is  more  dificult in larger  groups  which  becomes  problematic  when 
discussing complexity and riskiness, face coordination problems and directors may feel 
less  valued  given lower individual impacts  on  group  outcomes.   Despite  not  having 
fiduciary duty, the relationship of advisory boards on innovation is conceivably similar to 
boards of directors, which is an inverse-U yet largely negative. 
Proposition  3a:  The  proportion  of  directors  or  advisors from technical 
backgrounds would have a strong, positive relationship on innovation. 
Proposition  3b:  Controling for the  proportion  of technical  advisors, 
advisory board size wil have a negative relationship on innovation past a 
smaler, critical point. 
 
 
2.1.6. Theoretical Frameworks 
In the context of governance and innovation, agency theory has underpinned many 
studies pointing to a positive relationship, as it views managers having divergent interests 
to  shareholders  and  hence  a  great  need for  strong  governance to  protect  against 
opportunism. Agency theory formaly stems from the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
however the agency problem can root back to Adam Smith (1776), and his concern that 
if a firm was controled by a person who was not the owner, than the owners’ interests 
may become diluted and not fuly fulfiled. Agency problems occur when a principal party, 
such as an owner, engages another agent party, such as a manager, to perform decision 
making. In the  context  of  public  markets,  agency  costs  can  be  seen in the form  of 
monitoring  costs,  such  as  audits,  which limit  opportunism  by the  agent,  bonding  costs 
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which limit  power  contractualy  of the  agent,  and  a residual loss in terms  of reduced 
welfare. To address this, firms adopt internal governance mechanisms such as a board 
of directors, carefuly craft executive compensation and influence on ownership structure. 
As agency theory views owners as having divergent interests to managers, studies 
using such as a perspective are those which found a need for very strong governance 
mechanisms to ensure funds are being put forth to innovation over private benefit. This 
can  be  seen  as it is the  main theoretical framework in  studies finding relations of 
innovation  between  a  concentrated  ownership  structure,  high  management  ownership 
and  a large  and  diverse  board  of  directors.  Contra  agency theory,  stewardship theory 
assumes that managers wil generaly act as responsible agents, or stewards, of assets 
they  control  but  not  own.  Using  stewardship theory  as  a theoretical framework,  some 
scholarship  supports  duality  as  beneficial for firms  given  shared  values  and  goals 
(Donaldson  and  Davis,  1991),  and that the  need for  strong  governance  mechanisms 
depends on the relationships between the steward and the principal. 
2.1.7. Assumptions, Underpinnings and Gaps for Future Research 
While inquiry on governance and innovation has starting nearly three decades ago 
(Goodstein and Boeker, 1991), three critical assumptions that underpin inconclusiveness 
also expose gaps that exist within research on governance and innovation. 
Most studies are limited to specific jurisdictions and are not generalizable to other 
areas, hence leaving a gap for a conceptual relationship and theory for aspects of internal 
governance structures on innovation. While there are many strong relationships between 
aspects of governance and innovation, these are limited to specific contexts. Accordingly, 
most studies assume that studying innovation and governance in one jurisdiction can be 
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infered at the conceptual level, though that is flawed given the wide variance in findings 
for both, ownership structure and board structure. As countries vary widely in laws and 
institutions that  protect investors  and  hence influence  governance (Dyck  and  Zigales, 
2004;  Djankov,  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  and  Shleifer,  2006),  empirical  studies  are 
mixed and become largely dependent upon the jurisdiction they are researched within. 
Studies atempting to show the relationship as close to the conceptual relationship 
would need to exclude national influences of firm governance, such as diferences in laws 
surounding governance by domestic governments. What may appear as positive in one 
country  may  appear  negative in  another,  such  as  how  ownership  concentration  on 
innovation  appears  as  positive in the  United  States (Lacetera,  2001)  yet  negative in 
Canada (Di  Vito,  Laurin  and  Bozec,  2010)  due to  external institutions  efecting 
governance in  each  country (Morck,  Strangeland  and  Yeung,  2000).  As  almost  al 
research in the area only involves data from one country, the ability to understand the 
conceptual relationship between the ownership structure or board structure on innovation 
is highly limited. Accordingly, future research that addresses the jurisdictional limitations 
would be essential to understand a theoretical foundation of the relationship, which can 
be  used  as  a foundation in  countries  and  modeled to  properly identify  variables that 
maximize or stifle innovation. 
Since  most research focusses  on larger,  publicly traded firms,  advisory  boards 
have not been subject to any research. Many innovative, high-technology start-up firms 
use advisory boards instead of independent boards of directors as compensation can be 
lower and there is no fiduciary duty. The lack of empirical literature within this area is likely 
due to a lack of data given most of these firms are privately held. However, it remains 
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strongly important as these firms seek external investment, face steep failure rates, and 
investors rely on their ability to innovate for appreciation of these firms. Empirical research 
on weather or not advisory boards have similar efects on innovation to boards of directors 
would be very important. 
Second,  most  studies  assume that  mechanisms  of internal  governance  and 
innovation are related linearly, however a non-linear relationship may explain the wide 
range  of findings.  This  could  be  especialy important  of the  widely researched  area  of 
ownership concentration on innovation. At low levels of concentration, firms wil have an 
incentive to invest in innovation for  appreciation  of  shareholder  value;  yet  at the  other 
extreme,  may  be risk  averse  and  have  a  greater  desire  protect their investment  with 
modest appreciation. A similar paralel can be made with board size, with one extreme 
having too litle to form creative ideas and the other having too many people to arise at 
consensus.  Non-linear relationships  have  been tested for  external  governance 
mechanisms which reconciled the opposite linear relationships by others, such as Sapra, 
Subramanian  and  Subramanaian’s (2007) inverse-U  between takeover  pressure  and 
innovation. Accordingly, research that tests relationships with non-linear models would 
be important in understanding the relationship. 
Third, a major underlying assumption to inconclusiveness is the lack of construct 
clarity of “innovation” which influences the proxy variables chosen. Strategic management 
scholars  contend that innovation  does  not  have  a  single,  agreed-upon  definition 
(Baregheh, Rowley and Sambrook, 2009) and can take many forms largely drawn into 
either process as innovation, and innovation as process (Martin-de-Castro et. al, 2011). 
The former views a process of research and development leading to an innovation, with 
                                                            Page  | 47 
an innovation representing a new or improved commercialized product or service, while 
the later views innovation as happening at various moments and that progress on projects 
becomes innovation. With a multitude of measures for innovation competing findings may 
be found and limit ability to conduct meta-analysis. 
Commonly, innovation inputs such as research and development spending is used 
as a proxy for innovation, though it may not necessarily be reflective of innovation output 
despite it being the desired goal. Patents have also been used to measure innovation in 
studies of governance and innovation, however there are significant industrial limitations 
to their use. Scherer (1982) first employed successful patents as a proxy for innovation, 
however  not  al  patents  have  equal  economic  value  nor  utility.  To  address this,  other 
studies use patent citations which signals the value each patent provides in generating 
future cash flows. While patents and citations may realisticaly show innovation in some 
industries (Aghion, Reenen and Zingales, 2009), this may not be the case for industries 
which rely on business model innovation or keep trade secrets instead of issuing patents. 
Organizations in the later category would appear less innovative and play a role in results 
in the  case  of  studies  of firms from  multiple industries (Klienknect,  van  Montfort  and 
Brouwer, 2002). Accordingly, future studies need to define innovation clearly and use that 
definition to guide their proxy measure. 
2.2. Governance and Innovation in Initial Coin Oferings 
2.2.1. The Emergence of Initial Coin Oferings 
ICOs are a relatively new method of entrepreneurial finance, with some paralels 
to  crowdfunding (Pietrewicz,  2017) in their  need to  signal to investors legitimacy to 
overcome risk  of  underinvestment (Vismara,  Benaroio  and  Carne,  2017).  As  an 
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alternative to public oferings, venture capital or equity financing, crowdfunding refers to 
raising  capital through  a  web  platform  as  an intermediary, like IndiGoGo,  who  simply 
charge a fee, yet overal costs less than traditional forms of finance and expands the base 
of potential investors. The primary purpose of intermediation in crowdfunding is to ensure 
campaigns raise at least enough capital to develop its technology, known as a soft cap, 
otherwise it  does  not release  capital  held in  escrow to  proponents;  which  provides 
investors security in their investments only being used should the firm have the threshold 
resources to achieve its objectives.  
Utility tokens have no intermediation and hence can conceptualy reduce costs of 
raising  capital  even further than  crowdfunding.  As  utility token  are  blockchain  based, 
smart  contracts  power the  management  of the flow  of the funds  and  sometimes  also 
involve crypto walets or escrows to ensure minimum thresholds are met for the project 
to continue. While some early ICOs developed their own blockchain, most now use an 
existing  blockchain,  most  notably that  of  Ethereum.  The Ethereum  blockchain  alows 
entrepreneurs to  conduct  an ICO,  which technologicaly  alows  users to  design  smart 
contracts. Hence, users can create proprietary tokens that can exist on a platform and on 
the Ethereum blockchain. Wang, Ouyang, Yang, Ni, Han and Wang (2018) suggest smart 
contracts as a concept that can increase contractibility and facilitate exchange of money, 
property  or  value  without  conflict.  Smart  contracts  have  also  been  shown to  maximize 
overal  welfare through  disintermediation  which lowers transaction  costs (Catalini  and 
Gans,  2019).  Utility tokens  however,  do  not  make  any  enforceable  commitment to 
disclosing information at regular intervals with token holders, as most use smart contracts 
solely for financial exchange. 
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Proponents of UTOs issue whitepapers to communicate the potential viability of 
their ofering to potential investors, (Chen, 2017) that describes the project in terms of the 
business  case, technological  development, token rights  and  sometimes  organizational 
information  such  as the  advisory  board  or  development team.  Zetzsche,  Buckley, 
Barberis and Arner (2018) finds that only 14.2% of papers include important information 
as to how funding wil be pooled or segregated. The market price of tokens is generaly 
measured in terms  of  a  cryptocurency,  such  as  BitCoin  or  Ehtereum instead  of fiat 
curency.   Some  UTOs  begin  by raising  capital in  a  presale  phase,   which  may  give 
volume  bonuses for  early  contributors (Giudici  and  Adhami,  2018), folowed  by  a 
mainstream  campaign  over  a  period  of time.  Airdrops  also  exist  where  some  UTOs 
generate awareness, beter understand users and inspire loyalty by giving away a limited 
number  of tokens for free.  Among  others,  proponent  must  generaly  set the  minimum 
amount  of  capital  necessary for the  project  and the  maximum that  would  be  needed, 
designate  a total  number  of tokens that  would  be  distribute  and their  price, rights 
associated  with the token  and  designate rules for  alocating tokens to  management, 
founders, the advisory board and the general public. 
Research suggests utility token investors are similar to investors in the public stock 
market, as they hope to the token wil appreciate over time, and this depends on the utility 
token team’s ability to innovate. Interestingly, research shows the hoped future sale of 
tokens for  a  higher  price  as the  most important reason  behind token  holders of utility 
tokens, far above use of the token for its utility function and ataining a long-term equity 
stake in the  organization (Fisch,  2019).  When  contributors receive the token, they  are 
then  alowed to trade these tokens in  cryptocurency  exchanges,  similar to  secondary 
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markets,  which  position  utility tokens  similar to  public  oferings  as investors  hope for 
appreciation in their investment and can use such as a form of exchange (Cong, Li and 
Wang, 2019). While 47% of ICOs achieve success in meeting their minimum requirement 
of capital, 26% become listed on an exchange (Howel, Niessner and Yermack, 2018) 
which is  significant.  This  distinguishes  utility tokens  and  UTOs from  other forms  of 
entrepreneurial finance for it  adds  a  speculative  dimension (Fisch,  2019;  Lyandres, 
Palazzo  and  Rabeti,  2019).  Accordingly, the investment is  not  necessarily for 
management  using resources to  make incremental  profit,  but  on  whether  or not 
management develops a technology that becomes useful and popular. Hence, the risk 
investors of utility tokens incur, is on technological development and the degree of utility 
to innovation (Ankenbrand and Bieri, 2018). 
While there are similarities between utility tokens and public oferings, there are 
also some significant diferences. In literature on public oferings, after-market financial 
performance proxies are used as indicators of success, and not necessarily technological 
development. Whereas public oferings provide a share of ownership, utility tokens do not 
give ownership and are generaly in their early stages in contrast to established firms on 
the mainstream stock market. With greater disintermediation among UTOs, this leads to 
relatively smaler transaction costs (Howel, Niessner and Yermack, 2019). Aftermarket 
prices for tokens  are  very  volatile  and  can  be  classified  as  a  high risk-return holding 
(Lyandres, Palazzo and Rabeti, 2019). 
2.2.2. ICOs as an Empirical Seting for Governance and Innovation 
The utility token context alows for a strong empirical seting to study the theoretical 
relationship between governance and innovation for its ability to show greater causality. 
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First, remaining largely  unregulated, there  are few jurisdictional laws  and institutional 
factors that  could  afect their  adoption  of  governance  mechanisms,  as  al  governance 
mechanisms  adopted  by  utility tokens  are  entirely  voluntarily.  Second, there is  wide 
variation among utility tokens in their strength of governance, reflected in their variation 
of  disclosure  of  white  papers.  As there  are  no  audits  nor  standardized  disclosure 
practices,  most  utility tokens  do  not  discuss  policies for  appointing  advisors,  meeting 
frequencies,  and  are  not required to  meet  any threshold  of reporting  project  activities, 
objectives or teams they developed. Third, as start-up ventures proposing to develop a 
technology, essential for appreciation of the token value, there is a clearer cause-and-
efect with success in innovation causing token values to appreciate. Innovation in utility 
tokens is  also relatively  standardized,  being  blockchain-based  application  or  protocol 
development, and hence can be studied using the same proxy measures. 
While there  are  diferences  between  organizations that issue  utility tokens and 
traditional firms, there are striking similarities in power dynamics as there is relatively litle 
power of individual token holders, like retail investors, due to a high dispersion of investors 
leading to low individual influence (Giudici, 2016). Despite relative decline after reaching 
its peak in 2018, UTOs nonetheless provide a wealth of data as an empirical laboratory, 
with  overal funding  volumes far  exceeding  crowdfunding  with the largest utility token, 
Bitfinex, raising over $1 bilion in funding. The ICO context, which includes utility tokens, 
has been used to as an empirical seting to test theoretical relationships involving scam 
behaviour in markets (Deng, Lee and Zhong, 2018) and owner retention (Davydiuk, Gupta 
and Rosen, 2019). 
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Research on governance for utility tokens is also important, for there is a major 
power imbalance  between  utility token  proponents  and token-holders,  as  proponents 
retain total  control  of funds raised  after  successful  campaigns  and raises  several 
chalenges to regulators on whether or not regulation is needed and how regulation may 
proceed (Zetzsche, Buckley, Barberis and Arner, 2017). The power imbalance has led 
many to  classify  utility tokens  as  controversial in their legitimacy  as  means  of 
entrepreneurial finance, for their unregulated nature that alows start-ups to raise huge 
capital without any from compliance or intermediation, and hence poses a higher risk of 
fraudulent potential (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2018; Lyandres, Palazzo and Rabeti, 
2019; Chen and Belavitis, 2020; Momtaz, 2020). Without third-party intermediation nor 
any ownership rights, investors cannot be protected from misappropriation of funds by 
management,  as tokens  do  not  provide  any  voting rights  nor  counter  value (Howel, 
Niessner and Yermack, 2019). Altogether, the lack of intermediation provides lower costs 
to raising capital yet also creates immense potential for moral hazard. 
Investors, as a result, are left on their own to evaluate the quality of ventures from 
proponents and ensure the governance features each venture boasts would not lead their 
funds to  be  misappropriated.  As  several  poor  quality  utility tokens take  advantage  of 
quality signals (Momtaz, 2020) and exaggerate their true value, some jurisdictions have 
since  banned  utility tokens, including  China. In  2017, the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission in the United States issued a warning to potential investors about these risks, 
though  also  did  point to the innovative  potential (SEC,  2017).   Ventures  atempting to 
signal quality hence adopt strong governance structures, including escrow accounts to 
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provide greater protection to investors; however stronger governance protections overal 
in other forms of initial coin oferings have led to the relative decline of utility tokens.  
Research of governance on  utility tokens is also important for  considerations of 
blockchain, its  underlying technology,  which  can  have  very  disruptive  potential to 
governance functions in the  near future.  Blockchain technology is  a  decentralized 
infrastructure, that certifies information and securely stores information on the internet. 
As organizations are, essentialy, a ‘nexus of contracts’ between the firm, its shareholders 
and its stakeholders (Posner, 2004), the development of ‘smart contracts’ in blockchain 
have  disruptive  potential.  Smart  contracts  are those  certified  using  hashing,  a 
cryptographic  process, to  output  an ireversible fixed-length  alphanumeric  string  and 
recorded on a distributed ledger that ofers security, accuracy, immutability and anonymity 
(Yuan and Wang, 2016). The contract is hence bound to the web and not to any specific 
jurisdiction. Bitcoin and Ethereum both rely on blockchain technology as their foundation. 
Commercial financial applications such as payments, loans and other forms of exchange 
are  being  experimented.  Many large  banks, including in  Canada,  are investing in 
blockchain also for its opportunity to disintermediate financial transactions. 
2.2.3. Characteristics of Initial Coin Oferings 
Identifying  key trends in  behaviour  of  utility token investors is  contextualy 
important for research on identifying factors that can optimize their success and hence 
position  utility tokens  as  a legitimate form  of  venture finance. In  examining  motives  of 
investors to utility tokens, Fisch (2019) surveyed motivations for investors of blockchain 
start-ups and found that ideological and technological motives are equaly important. In 
evaluating  data  sources,  Boreiko  and  Vidusso (2019)  explores reputations  of  data 
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sources for ICOs, pointing to how ICOs can buy reviews and rankings that can convey 
trust,  highlighting  potential for fraud  and the  chalenge to find reliable reviews.  Chen 
(2020) found diferent types of signals are processed diferently depending on the stage 
of utility tokens. In  particular, it  was found that  at the  crowd  sale level,  highly  credible 
signals that are easily interpreted are most commonly discerned by inventors; that signals 
lower in credibility yet easily interpreted are most commonly used at listing, and that when 
signals are not easily interpreted, they lose their value. In addition, the study also revealed 
that investor comments on social media play an important role in information surveilance 
of the signals by the proponent. 
To drive beter analysis of the unique market of utility tokens, scholarship has also 
begun identifying underlying contextual characteristics. Garat and Oordt from the Bank 
of  Canada  show the  major reason  behind the  decline  of  utility tokens,  was regulatory 
pressure, presence of fraud, and relatively poor performance. Catalini and Gans (2018) 
examine ICO productivity, and find platform productivity is reflected in the token price and 
network size. Research suggests that market prices are not meaningful in the analysis of 
utility tokens, given they are highly volatile and easy to manipulate. When market price is 
used, research can become skewed towards some successful ventures; however Howel, 
Niessner and Yermack’s (2018) study of liquidity in the secondary market for tokens, was 
not nearly as skewed as others for proceeds or returns, when expressed in logarithmic 
terms. 
Studies of jurisdictions where ventures are based reveals that the greatest number 
of proponents is from the United States, folowed by Russia, China, India and Western 
Europe (Howel,  Niessner  and  Yermack,  2018).  Kostovetsky  and  Benedeti (2018) 
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examined underpricing using a sample of over 4000 ICOs, which unveiled an average 
return of 179% from the first day market price. While there are few external conditions to 
success, there  have  been  some  dimensions  explored  which include  capital  gains in 
cryptocurencies relative to fiat curency, market dynamics, social media networks and 
media sentiment, the later two of which represent external governance. 
2.2.4. Governance of Initial Coin Oferings 
Governance  of  utility tokens have  become  an increasingly important  domain  of 
research for its  perceived  value to  beter legitimate  such tokens  as  a  means for 
entrepreneurial finance.  Legal  scholars  generaly  argue for increased  governance  on 
utility tokens, viewing such as a medium to exchange value in black markets (Hardy and 
Norgaard,  2016;  Abramowicz,  2016),  prevent its  use in  money laundering (Brenig  and 
Müler  2015)  and  properly  draw taxable revenue.  Due to  concerns  about the lack  of 
universal regulation,  over twenty-five  countries  are  considering  comprehensive 
cryptocurency regulations (Kaal and Del Erba, 2017). Foley et al (2019) estimates 46% 
of Bitcoin is linked to ilicit activities and cals for more regulation. However, others from 
an Austrian School orientation argue against universal regulation as it would make utility 
tokens lose some of its competitive advantage through disintermediation. In particular, 
they suggest that making governance standards totaly voluntarily alows utility tokens to 
use governance mechanisms as value-enhancing, for universal standards may reduce 
their value on ensuring utility tokens are legitimate. 
Empirical research focussed  on identifying  key  success factors to  utility tokens 
generaly have a governance orientation. Hsieh, Vergne and Wang (2017) study internal 
and  external  governance  of  some  cryptocurencies  which focussed  on  examining 
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management  ownership  vis-à-vis  disclosures  of token  alocations in  white  papers, 
formalized fvoting, and social media reputation. Several working papers show that total 
supply, the  percentage  of tokens retained  by founders,  having  a  base  on  Ehtereum, 
lengthy white papers and a presence on GitHub are related to investor confidence and 
signal  quality (Amsden  and  Schweizer,  2018;  Deng,  Lee  and  Zhong,  2018;  Adhami, 
Giudici and Martinazzi, 2018). Presence on GitHub or Telegram can be seen as a utility 
tokens technical transparency, as they normaly post source code on one of these two 
sites to show and prove their progress. Whitepaper length can be seen as a utility tokens’ 
disclosure, varying greatly due to litle regulation about what needs to be included, and 
founder token retention resembles management ownership, representing a portion of the 
value that the organization is able to build. Availability of the source code on GitHub or 
Telegram with lengthy white papers have also been studied to corelate with success in 
becoming listed  and reach  stated fundraising  goals (Guiduci  and  Adhami,  2018; 
Bourveau, De George, Elahie and Macciocchi, 2018) implying for potential relationships 
with innovation. An, Duan, Hou and Xu (2019) tests the efects of disclosure on human 
capital founder background and team on ICO outcomes.  
Two  published  empirical  papers focus  on  governance, in  a  broad  sense,  as  a 
success factor to  utility tokens.  Adhami,  Giudici  and  Martinazzi (2018) investigate 
determinants of ICO fundraising success, and their research suggests that the availability 
of project code and disclosure of legal jurisdiction are strong predictors as they facilitate 
transparency and can provide for legal action against founders. Interestingly, provision of 
a white paper was insignificant. In a folow up paper, Adhami and Giudici (2018) solely 
investigate governance signals on fundraising success and find that advisory commitee 
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size positively and significantly corelates with financial performance; and that the fraction 
of tokens retained by insiders and managers are also significant. In studying determinants 
of capital amounts raised, Fisch (2018) finds a lengthy white paper, US location and base 
on Ehtereum were the strongest predictors of such success with the price of bitcoin and 
pre-sale factors as insignificant. 
Recent  studies  of  various topics  of token  ownership  have  pointed to  possibly 
significant  outcomes.  Boreiko  and  Risteski (2020)  studied investor  behaviour  and 
demonstrated that serial investors, overal, contribute early, however are less informed 
than general retail investors and pick lesser quality utility tokens as a result. They also 
find that only large serial investors which are within the top 1% of investors, actively invest 
more in campaigns that raise more funds, atract contributors and reach hard caps. 
There is limited research  on  ownership  structure in the  context  of initial  coin 
oferings.  One  study  provides  some initial insight into  direction  and  magnitude  of their 
influence on ICO success, with success defined as post-ICO financial performance. Fisch 
and Momtaz (2020) studied institutional backing of ICOs and find it is generaly associated 
with  higher  post-ICO financial  performance  after  considering  selection  and treatment 
efects. They used a database from cryptofundresearch.com to see lists of institutional 
investor backing, which included 750 institutional investors and the UTOs they invested 
in. 
2.2.5. Theoretical Frameworks 
 There  are  very few  papers  which  make  specific reference to  a theoretical 
framework,  however  some  employ  signaling theory  when  discussing the role  of 
governance of utility tokens on performance. Signals are observed variables, sent from 
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an informed party to a less informed party, which in turn discloses characteristics of a 
business, including trust and perceived risk of ventures (Wels, Valacich and Hess, 2011). 
This framework has mostly been applied to examining variables disclosed in white papers 
including  social  capital  signals including  utility token founder  backgrounds, team  size, 
description  of  projects,  and  awards  grants  and  patents  of  utility tokens  by  external 
agencies (Guiduci  and  Adhami,  2018). Implicitly,  most research  also  stems from 
institutional transaction  cost theory,  which  states  economic  eficiency  can  be  gained 
through institutions that minimize transaction costs, such as search costs, enforcement 
costs  and  decision  costs (North, 1993).  Accordingly, it  assumes  bounded rationality 
instead of complete rationality in agency theory, in that agents act as rational as they can 
based on available information. However, like agency theory, assumes that al parties act 
in  self-interest  behaviour.  Transaction  cost theory  can  be  applied to the justification  of 
utility tokens  and  UTOs  as  a  means to  entrepreneurial finance,  by  minimizing 
transactions, and through the signaling literature where principals provide information to 
agents, they  enable  agents to  make  more rational  decisions. It  also  assumes that 
investors bear search costs to seek relevant information, which can be gleaned from with 
research  of  utility tokens that  explore internal  controls, information  disclosure  and the 
advisory board. 
2.2.6. Areas for Future Research 
There  are  several  gaps  of research  on  governance  of  utility tokens.  First,  most 
literature  exploring  governance  within this realm  does  not  consult  broader literature  of 
governance,  and  accordingly,  has  missed  several  key  variables in  governance.  Most 
scholarship focusses solely on governance protocols, and studies exploring ownership 
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and the board are very limited. To date, there has been no study exploring ownership 
concentration,  arguably the  most important internal  governance  mechanism,  nor  have 
any studies examined the advisory boards in detail. With available data for both and given 
their heavy influence in traditional firms, a more theoreticaly robust model accounting for 
key areas of internal governance would be important, as it may uncover key areas that 
relate to the performance of the venture. A comprehensive model accounting for most 
major areas of internal governance should be developed in order to beter understand the 
value of major mechanisms of governance. 
Second, as with the general case of governance and innovation, most studies only 
explore for linear relationships. Given the lack of theoretical foundations from which work 
on utility token draw, models were created only linearly to explore diferent dimensions of 
internal  governance,  however this  may  not  be  expected  given the  many  positive  and 
negative findings that also appear when applied to the utility token seting. 
Third,  a  greater focus  on innovation  as  a  success  metric  should  be  paramount. 
Given  utility tokens  only  appreciate in real  value if the technological innovation they 
develop succeeds, such should become of greater importance in its use as a success 
metric. While prior literature atempts to measure success factors, most use proxies for 
meeting fundraising  goals  or listing  status, this  may  not  concur  with technological 
development or innovation and only 4% survive after two years. There is an exception in 
Deng, Lee and Zhong (2018) which included technological development activity in their 
model. Altogether, it is acknowledged that governance of utility tokens have significance 
on  a range  of  outcomes,  and future research  should  consider  a  greater foundation  of 
literature in  governance,  greater  exploration  of  governance  mechanisms 
                                                            Page  | 60 
comprehensively,  seek  non-linear relationships  and  use innovation  activity  as  a  more 
frequent proxy of success. 
2.3. Conclusion 
This literature review was conducted to provide context for marying the theoretical 
framework of innovation and governance with the empirical seting of utility tokens. As 
demonstrated, governance and innovation research is in its early stages and is presently 
inconclusive of the direction and strength of a number of internal governance mechanisms 
and their relation with innovation. As jurisdictional setings are a major underpinning to 
inconclusiveness, and utility tokens are not tied to specific jurisdictions hence not being 
subject to national-level institutional and regulatory influences on governance, they can 
provide for an innovative seting to examine aspects of the conceptual relationship. While 
data for  advisory  boards  of  privately  held traditional  high-technology firms would  be 
chalenging to  access,  such is  widely  available for  utility tokens including  an  ability to 
investigate innovation from  open  source repositories.  Further,  governance research  of 
utility tokens  have  not  examined its relationship to innovation,  which is  key to its 
appreciation nor consulted the broader governance to guide empirical study. While many 
studies  of  utility tokens  examine the relationship  with fundraising  campaign  or listing 
success, their relation to innovation is fertile ground and important as innovation is directly 
linked to their long-term token  holder  value.  Altogether,  studying  utility tokens  as  an 
empirical  seting for the  conceptual relationship  between innovation  and  governance 
appears fruitful and could drive some innovative insights into the broader theory and to 
the important and curent situation of utility tokens. 
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The literature review was limited by space and time and accordingly not al works 
discussing innovation,  governance  or  utility tokens  was  discussed.  While  works  were 
selected for their relative influence and importance to the situation at hand, other research 
exists  and  could  also  be  consulted in the future.  Additionaly,  several  papers  of 
governance in the utility token seting are only in the working paper stage; however, were 
included as their insights are meaningful and have been cited themselves in prominent, 
published articles in the discipline. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Research Design 
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3.1. Philosophical Approach 
The philosophical approach that would lead to the most fruitful insights in testing 
research hypotheses based on the propositions ofered in the preceding section, would 
be that  of  post-positivism.  This framework  assumes that  an  objective reality  exists 
between the  constructs  of internal  governance  mechanisms  and innovation, to  which 
empirical research  can  access.  While the  specific reality  of  how internal  governance 
mechanisms interact with innovation  can  only  be  approximated,  statistics  can 
nonetheless  model  an  approximation for its interaction  which  would  be  useful for 
improving understanding. By relying on a theoreticaly informed model, large sample size, 
and quality statistical analysis, this paper aims to have optimal validity and reliability for 
this factor within the relationship. 
Using a quantitative approach, this thesis hopes to understand how the constructs 
of internal governance and innovation relate, by using the context of utility tokens, which 
is  not  only  useful for  understanding  an important  dimension in the  novel  method  of 
entrepreneurial finance,  but  also for  showing  how the  constructs relate  given that 
contracts bound by smart contracts are not influenced by national-level variation sin the 
political  environment.  Data from  utility tokens about their internal  governance  and 
innovation activity are widely available on the internet and within databases. Accordingly, 
the  particular  epistemology  of  statistical  analysis  and  model  building is the  most 
appropriate.  Models  can  approximate the impact  of  how the  constructs relate to  one 
another  conceptualy,  and  statistical  analysis  of  empirical  data  applied to the  models 
would show support or rejection. 
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3.2. Initial Coin Ofering Data 
This  study is  based  on  a  sample  of  525  utility tokens,  based  on  Ethereum  and 
identified as having started their fundraising campaign initiated prior to January 2016 and 
ended before December 2019, had met their fundraising goal, and had a complete profile 
on ICOBench.com, etherscan.io and a working GitHub account. The start date of January 
2016 was chosen as there was very litle utility token ofering activity prior to 2016. With 
most activity occuring in 2018 and ensuring at least six months of post-ICO technological 
development  can  be  captured, the  end  date  of  December  2019  was  chosen,  as the 
sample was downloaded in July 2020. In total, this provides three years of data.  
This  study first  downloaded  a  sample  of  utility tokens from ICObench 
(www.icobench.com), a major database with wide coverage of utility tokens (Huang et. 
al., 2019). This database is useful as it provides comprehensive information about a range 
of utility tokens. Some pieces of useful information provided for each token include the 
characteristics of the utility token and its campaign description, sectoral tags, milestones 
for  projected technological  development, information  about the top  management team 
and information about advisors. External links to social media profiles, including GitHub 
for the utility token and LinkedIn profiles for the team and advisors, are also provided. In 
addition, the  website  also  aggregates  several rankings from  experts  who rank token 
projects. This provided an initial population of 1,855 utility tokens. One limitation of using 
ICObench is they delete some accounts which were unable to meet their fundraising floor, 
known as a softcap, whereby utility tokens would refund any investment if they do not 
reach such level and not proceed further. However, this study was only focused on those 
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which did meet their fundraising goal to study post-ICO relationships between governance 
and innovation and such limitation of the database was thereby not relevant. 
To capture data related to technological development and innovation activity, the 
study  narowed itself to those  UTOs  which  had  an  active  GitHub  account 
(www.github.com). GitHub is  a  source  code  management  software that  alows 
colaboration in creating code for programs. In GitHub, utility tokens upload their original 
source code to a repository, for the blockchain application they eventualy wish to further 
develop. Utility tokens may have more than one repository, but generaly only have one 
main repository  which then references the  sub-repositories  as  necessary. Through 
GitHub, one is able to study innovation activity as records are made each time a proposal 
for code modification is made, known as a pul request, and eventualy accepted, known 
as a merged pul request. Tokens not having a Github account have been demonstrated 
to be a major variable indicative of the utility tokens being a scam (Bourveau, De George, 
Elahie and Macciocchi, 2018). As Github accounts are necessary for studying innovation 
in the utility token context, it is noted that the sample drawn would not be representative 
of al ICOs but rather imply those with a GitHub account. Links to each Github account 
were retrieved from hyperlinks on their ICObench profiles and were manualy checked to 
ensure they were active. Of the 1,855 tokens remaining in the sample, 641 had links that 
leading to  404 erors, indicating inactive  accounts.  Accordingly, the  sample  was then 
narowed to 1,214 tokens. 
Ownership data for each token was then gathered from etherscan.io, where each 
token in the sample was cross searched. Etherscan (www.etherscan.io) provides a list of 
each transfer of tokens Ethereum-based tokens, recording specific blockchain addresses. 
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The  website  provides  a “holders” tab  which then  displays the  percentage  of tokens 
distributed and owned tokens held by diferent addresses. 
While owner identities are anonymous, each token holder has a unique address it 
uses to buy and sel tokens. Some tokens had multiple profiles load for similarly named 
tokens  without  an  exact  match  appearing  or  did  not  show  up  at  al  as they  may  have 
changed their name from listing on ICObench. The major limitation to this database is 
that, in some cases, a token holder can technicaly have multiple addresses if they want 
to  hide their  activity,  however this  cannot  be tracked  and  searched.   For reliability 
purposes, the  study is limited to tokens  which  had  a  clearly identifiable  and  active 
Etherscan.io profile, being those with the exact same name and website domain of the 
token as ICObench and having at least one transaction. These token profiles that were 
unclear on whether or not they were the same token as that from the existing sample did 
not appear to have any diferent data hence positioning this as a random eror. Of the 
remaining 1,214 tokens in the sample of those with an ICObench listing and an active 
Github  account,  a total  of  525  had  a  clearly identifiable  and  complete listing  on 
etherscan.io, which then became the final sample.   
For data on institutional ownership, the Original Crypto Fund List database from 
Crypto Fund Research (www.cryptofundresearch.com) was used. It was purchased and 
downloaded as at September 10, 2020, to provide a relatively up to date listing of over 
800  crypto funds for  which  al  are  either  hedge funds  or  venture  capital firms. The 
database lists the various tokens each fund has investment within. While it is noted as 
the most comprehensive list of crypto funds (Fisch and Momtaz, 2020), it is possible that 
other funds and venture capital firms may exist and are not captured by this database. 
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Further, the  database  simply lists the tokens  each fund is invested in,  and does  not 
quantify the percentage owned in each token which limits the ability to assign weights of 
institutional ownership beyond a count of funds invested within. 
To  measure  any informal  national  efect,  country-level  data  was recorded for 
tokens which disclosed a country. Three measures were used, namely the Democracy 
Index by the Economic Inteligence Unit, the United Nations Human Development Index, 
sourced from the  United  Nations  website,  and OECD  Membership,  sourced from the 
OECD website. 
Accordingly, the final sample is of 525 utility tokens, and represents a large sample 
to find relationships between governance and innovation, with respect to the propositions 
the study intends to  operationalize.  As  noted  by  others,  samples  examining  post-ICO 
performance are generaly greatly reduced than the population of tokens for a specific 
time period with a final sample of around 500 tokens (Fish and Momtaz, 2020, Lyandres 
et al, 2019; Benedeti and Kostovetsky, 2018). This study by Benedeti and Kostovesky 
(2018) is similar, as the original sample of tokens over time period was over 1,800 from 
listings on ICObench; and the reduced sample of 525 presents a rather large sample to 
study the post-UTO variables of interest. 
3.3. Dependent Variable 
The concept aimed to be operationalized as the dependent variable for this study 
is innovation outcomes. According to Schumpeter (1934), innovation can be defined as 
the introduction  of  a  new  product,  process  or  system  and the  process to reach this 
introduction. The perspective of innovation as a process has been defined as an idea’s 
introduction, application and implementation (West and Far, 1990; van de Ven, 1986) 
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which is contra the perspective of innovation as an outcome, which focusses on the actual 
introduction of a product, process or system considered new to the environment to which 
it is introduced (Damanpour,  1992;  Pennings  and  Harianto,  1992).  Traditionaly, 
operationalizing innovation as output has been rather dificult. Some scholars have used 
patents and the percentage of sales driven from these patents (Shaprio, Tang, Wang and 
Zhang, 2015), however this is limited as some firms may express innovation diferently. 
As noted by van den Berg (2007), “accounting, as it is curently practiced, has lost much 
of its ability to inform as businesses have become more and more knowledge intensive,” 
refering to issues in measuring intelectual capital. Indeed, measuring knowledge is an 
onerous task (van den Berg, 2013) as many firms may experience diferent outcomes of 
research and development spending and some inputs may be more successful to others. 
As this  study  uses the  context  of  utility tokens,  which  al  develop  applications  on 
blockchain to solve problems in a wide range of industries, similar to software, innovation 
outcomes  can  be  measured  consistently  as incremental  developments towards their 
technology. 
Innovation  activity for  utility tokens is  observed from  activity  on their  GitHub 
repositories.  Contributors,  which  are  mostly  employees  and founders  of  utility tokens 
though  can  also  be the  general  public,  process  modifications to  a  code to  either  add, 
delete or modify certain elements and add a feature or improve some element and create 
a commit. It  may take  a  number  of  commits to form  a  single feature,  where  multiple 
commits  necessary to  accomplish the  same  goal  are formed together to  a  single  pul 
request, that developers propose for merger into the source code and become activated. 
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A moderator of the account then decides if the open pul request would become a 
part of the source code, and usualy tests the code to ensure it works and examines it to 
ensure it adds value to the project. If it does work and add value, the moderator, who are 
normaly the founders,  wil  accept the  pul request  and  make the feature  available  by 
merging it into the source code. If not, they can comment on why it was not accepted for 
merging and sometimes suggest revisions if there is value in the intent of the code but 
erors within it. Once a pul request is submited by the developer, it is known as an open 
pul request, if examined and not merged is known as a closed pul request, and if merged 
into the code, becomes a merged pul request. 
As this study uses the definition of innovation as outcome, and thus focusses on 
introduced applications within the context of utility tokens, it operationalizes innovation as 
merged  pul requests.  Merged  pul requests  have  been  used  as  one  of five  proxy 
indicators  of technological  development  by  a  smal  number  of researchers in  general 
(Vasilescu et. al, 2015) and within the ICO context (Deng, Lee and Zhong, 2018). In the 
later, other variables included the number of contributors, commits, and the number of 
stars and forks. Stars are the number of times someone subscribes to a GitHub account’s 
feed to receive updates on changes, and forks are when the code is copy and pasted 
likely to create a commit. Given the availability of innovation data, merged pul requests 
can be suggested to best exemplify the output of innovation. The data on pul requests 
merged  was  downloaded  by  scraping the  Github  accounts for  al repository  URLs, 
selecting the  main repository  as indicated  by  having the  highest  number  of forks,  and 
scraping the total for the  number  of  merged  pul requests,  using the “Puls” tab, and 
filtering each to be “is:pr is:closed is:merged”. 
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Given a high degree of standard deviation, the natural logarithm of pul requests 
merged is taken which presents the strongest transformation (LNPULLSMERGED) to 
best normalize the variable. It is taken as: 
LNPULLSMERGED = LN(1+PulsMerged) 
Like prior research (Deng, Lee and Zhong, 2018), which focused on activity on the 
main repository to a GitHub account, which would usualy represent its final code. Some 
accounts  have  multiple repositories,  however those that  are implemented  would  be 
referenced in the main repository. While observing pul requests merged only to the main 
repository, this  study  hence  becomes limited  as it  excludes  merged requests to  other 
repositories. However, many of the other repositories may not be referenced in the source 
code and used for experimentation, hence exclusion of the few that are referenced is the 
best, consistent method to capture merged pul requests. 
3.4. Independent Variables 
 
  The  concept that  guides independent  variables is internal  governance,  and in 
particular, the two major elements of internal governance being ownership structure and 
board structure. To capture ownership structure of utility tokens, the study operationalizes 
two  major  concepts  of  ownership  structure,  namely  ownership  concentration  which 
measures the percentage of shares held by large investors, and institutional ownership, 
which refers to the degree of ownership by institutions, notably hedge funds and venture 
capital firms in the utility token context. 
  Ownership concentration was measured as the percentage of utility token supply 
owned by those who hold at least 1% of the total owned supply. These token holders are 
coloquialy  named  as “whales”, (PWHALE).  This  variable  was  gleaned from 
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downloading the first five pages for ownership data from Etherscan, and calculating the 
sum  of  percentages  owned  by  any investor  with  over  1% in the token.  To test the 
proposition for a quadratic relationship for an inverse U, a Herfindahl measure was taken, 
as consistent with previous research, which squares the ownership concentration term. 




To capture institutional investment (INST), this study counts the number of times each 
token  appears  within the  CrytoFund  Research  database.  This  method indicates the 
number of institutions that are invested in each token, which is the best measure possible 
considering the database does not give the percentage of tokens each fund owns. 
AB>C=	) (A435D5E5D943	A4F0350:)	 
An  additional  measure for the  percentage  of the token  supply  distributed to the 
public (PDIST)  was  also  captured  as  a  context-specific  measure  of  ownership 
concentration, whereas token founders reserve a percentage of the token supply for their 
own  purposes.  This  could  be for  proceeds in terms  of team  bonuses,  developer 
incentives, investments in  marketing, referal  programs  or  other  expenditures. It  was 
captured  as it  was reported  as  a  significant  variable towards listing  success, financial 
performance and meeting specified softcaps. This variable was gleaned from ICObench. 
To test  potential  quadratic relation, the  squared term  was  also  considered, 
accordinglywhere: 
PDIST = (Percentage Distributed) 
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PDISTSQ = (PDIST+1)2 
To  measure  board  structure, this  study  counts the  number  of  advisory  board 
members (NADVISOR)  as listed  on ICObench.  To  measure technical intensity  of the 
board directors the number of advisors with a technical background is first taken. This is 
defined as counting the number of advisors (NTECHADVISOR) with a degree posted 
on their LinkedIn profile in the field of computer science, engineering or technology, and 
then dividing it by NADVISOR. To test quadratics, squared terms of both the number of 
advisors (NADVISORSQ) and percentage of technical advisors (PTECHADVISORSQ) 







3.5. Control Variables 
A range of control variables were recorded as they may have influence the number 
of  pul requests  merged,  and  could influence  ownership  structure  and  board  structure. 
Weather or not a token disclosed its based country was recorded as a binary variable, 
(COUNTDISC) where 1 indicates they disclose their country and 0 is recorded for those 
which do not. Ofering a prototype or minimaly viable product (MVP) at the utility token 
ofering  stage  was  also recorded  on  a  binary  scale,  with  1  suggesting there  was  a 
prototype or minimaly viable product available during the UTO stage, and 0 indicating 
there was not. It is assumed that if their token already has a minimaly viable product, 
they would need to do less to achieve their desired state. Binary variables for specifying 
a softcap (SOFTCAP) and hardcap (HARDCAP) were also recorded as binary with 1 
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indicating the token had one specified and 0 indicating they did not. A UTO’s softcap is 
the campaign floor, or minimum amount of tokens that need to be sold in order for the 
project to be funded, as they need a certain amount of funds to develop their token. In 
general, if a softcap is not met, funds are returned to the purchases and the project is 
deemed as unsuccessful.  In contrast, a hardcap is the campaign ceiling, or maximum 
amount a project can be funded. These decisions are made by creators to create a sense 
of  scarcity  and  drive the  price  of their token  by limiting  quantity.  These  were found 
significant in research  exploring technical  development  of  UTOs technological 
development (Deng, Lee and Zhong, 2018). 
Ratings  are reported from ICOBench, for  which the  aggregate,  overal rating  of 
each recorded (ICORATING). Ratings may act as a veting of the proposition of the utility 
tokens.  Accordingly,  one  with  a  higher ranking  may  be  more  successful  at  achieving 
investment and driving expectations for it to perform. The duration of the campaign was 
recorded  as the  number  of  days the token  was in ICO (DURATION).  The  number  of 
countries to  which the token  was restricted  were  counted recorded (NRESTRICTED) 
which could impact, among other things, the number of potential owners. 
To  ensure the lack  of jurisdictional influence, the  country  was recorded  as  a 
nominal variable from ICOBench and their characteristics were operationalized by relying 
on three scales. First, the Human Development Index by the United Nations (HDI) was 
used,  which  measures life  expectancy,  education  and  other  variables  on  a  per  capita 
basis. The raw ranking was recorded, which was on a 0 to 10 scale. OECD membership 
(OECD) was recorded on a binary scale with 1 showing membership, and 0 if not. The 
Democratic  Ranking (DEMRANK)  by the  Economic Inteligence  Unit  measures 
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democracy and is captured as the raw ranking of that country, on a 0 to 10 scale. This 
metric is important as democratic institutions are positioned to be a significant factor to 
innovation. Idealy, these would not be significant which shows variance is captured in 
other variables. Nominal countries and Industry were also recorded nominaly to observe 
distributions among key variables of interest. 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  definitions  of  al  variables, including the  dependent, independent  and 
control variables, are provided in Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics, including the minimum, 
maximum and mean averages along with standard deviation is provided in Table 3.2. In 
this table, it is shown that the average percentage owned by whales, who are those that 
own more than 1% of a single token, is nearly 80% (Table 3.2), which indicates tokens, 
overal, have a high degree of ownership concentration. Tokens within the sample have 
an average of .38 institutional investors. Digging deeper into the data, most do not have 
any institutional investment with  476  of  525  having  no institutional investment.  Among 
those that  do, the  median is  1 institutional investor  with  only  7  having  more than  10 
institutions invested within their token (Table 3.2). 
The average  percent  of the token  supply  distributed in  UTO is just  over  half,  at 
54.99% (Table 3.2), which means that the token team itself generaly keeps just under 
half for its own purposes. As tokens can do many things with the number of tokens, they 
reserve for themselves,  such  data is  only  available in the  white  papers  and  was  not 
recorded for the purposes of this study. 
The average number of advisors was 6 (Table 3.2), which represents a reasonable 
number  comparable to  sizes  of  most high-tech  start-ups’  number  of  external  board  of 
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directors, which average at 4.75 (Clarysse, Knockaert and Locket, 2007). Of these, just 
over a quarter (28.5%) have a technical background (Table 3.2). Other positions that may 
comprise the remaining  advisors include lawyers,  accountants,  and  crypto 
businesspeople and general business leaders. 
Tokens have anywhere from 0 to 1549 pul requests merged (Table 3.2), which is 
a substantial range. Given the high standard deviation, this variable was normalized to 
the best it could through a transformation using the natural logarithm, which is the most 
powerful transformation. The high standard deviation implies that some merge lots of pul 
requests, while others don’t. A deeper dive into the data reveals that a substantial number 
of repositories had 0 activity, thus the data is zero-inflated with 395 merging 0 puls. This 
is normal with most studies which also use patents as a dependent variable for studies of 
traditional firms (Chen, Li, Shapiro and Zhang, 2014) and usualy leads these studies to 
use a zero-inflated poison distribution.  
  57% of tokens studied had a hardcap implemented (Table 3.2), which represents 
a mechanism to cap fundraising after a certain amount is raised within the campaign. This 
ensures that funds wil be used towards innovation and not for profit of the management 
team  who  are  expected to  profit  of  of the tokens they  do  not  distribute to the  public. 
Interestingly, only 26% specified a softcap (Table 3.2), or minimum for the campaign to 
proceed. If campaigns do not surpass the softcap, funds are refunded to investors and 
this could act as protection for them not investing in a token that would not otherwise have 
funds to innovate their  project.  Other  notable  descriptive  statistics is that  an ICO 
campaign lasts just  over two  months  at  69  days,  and  29%  disclose  a  base  country to 
where they operate. 
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The average human development index of countries to the tokens included in the 
sample is  over  87% (Tab le  3.2)  which represents those  within the  sample  and  are 
disclosed, are mostly wel-developed countries. Similarly, average democratic ranking is 
high at just over 7, which is strong and implies that less UTOs with active GitHub accounts 
are based in non-democratic countries. 53% of the utility tokens disclose being based in 
a  country  with  OECD  membership, representing  an  even  split  between  members  and 
non-members. This may not be true of al utility tokens, however since this sample was 
limited to those with an active GitHub account. Those without that account would be more 
likely to  be  a  scam token.  Further,  while the tokens  declare  a  certain  country  as their 
base, the founders  may  al  be located  elsewhere  and  hence they  may  choose  more 
developed countries on purpose, implying significant limitations in reading statistics of this 
variable. 
Some interesting findings can be discerned by examining variances by declared 
country (Table 3.3). Most UTOs in the sample are based out of Singapore (62), USA (54), 
the  UK (48),  Estonia (37),  Russia (40),  and  Switzerland (24).  While  USA, the  UK  and 
Russia  are  very large  countries,  Singapore,  Estonia,  and  Switzerland thereby  have  a 
disproportionate number of declared countries for UTOs. 
In terms  of  concentration,  of  countries  with  over  8  utility tokens, those  based in 
France have the lowest average concentration, at 64.96%, whereas those based in India 
and Hong Kong have much higher levels at 99.41% and 89.23% respectively. Institutional 
investment also varies widely in countries, with the highest average number of institutional 
investors in Canada at 2.13 amoung countries with 8 or more UTOs (Table 3.3). The USA 
is second with 1.5 average institutional investors, a stark contrast from Singapore at 0.38, 
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Russia at .3, the UK and India at .1, Hong Kong at .12, Gibralter at .11 and and Estonia 
at  0.03.  As  Canada  and the  UK  do  not  difer  much in terms  of laws  as they  are  both 
Commonwealth nations, this may mean that UTOs whose founders are from elsewhere 
target the later countries as the bases for their utility token. 
Surprisingly, the number of advisors is relatively consistent, with those of 8 UTOs 
or more having between 5 and 7.25 advisors (Table 3.3). The percentage of technical 
advisors is also fairly standard, with India having the least at 16.78% and those based in 
France  having the  most  at  38.36% (Table  3.3).   The  natural logarithm  of  puls  varies 
widely  across  countries,  with the lowest  number  among those  with  8  UTOs  or  more, 
reporting their base as Germany at .1, and the highest in the USA at 1.29 and France at 
1.35, on average. 
Interesting  observations  can  also  be  drawn from  variance  across  multiple 
industries (Table  3.4).  Among industries  with  5  UTOs, the  percentage  of  whales is 
generaly  consistent  with those in tourism  seeing lowest  concentration  at  66.78%  and 
those in media the most concentrated at 92.16%. Approximately half of the industries had 
no institutional investment,  such  as  charities,  gambling,  education,  energy,  health, 
manufacturing, realty, retail, sports, tourism and virtual reality. Only two industries have 
an  average  number  of institutional investors  above  1,  specificaly  banking  at  1.36  and 
infrastructure at 2.07. This may reflect sectoral preferences of institutional investors. 
The number of advisors is relatively consistent, with the lowest number on average 
in  education  at  3.4  and  highest  number in  software  at  9.  The  percentage  of technical 
advisors ranges  with  many  at the lower  and  higher  ends  of the  scale.  The lowest 
percentage of technical advisors can be found in charity at 12.5%, and the highest number 
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being  present in  energy  at  42.06%  aside from those  classified  as  other,  which  was 
reported at 48.01%. The natural logarithm of puls merged is relatively consistent with a 
smal number of outliers. On the low side, charity, health, energy, electronics, education, 
legal, manufacturing and virtual reality sectors averaged 0, while sports, infrastructure, 
software and media al averaged over 1 with sports at 2.99. Smal sample sizes for each 
industry limits ability to concretely analyze sectoral influence, however the variances are 
nonetheless noted.  
3.7. Research Design and Model Specifications 
  The relationships between internal governance and innovation of utility tokens was 
examined using ordinary least squares and is supported by stepwise regressions and a 
zero-inflated poison distribution. As two variables were tested for quadratic relationships, 
the  method  of  ordinary least  squares  was  employed for its  ease in interpreting results 
from  quadratic relationships.  Regressions  were  conducted  within  SPSS  using  ordinary 
least squares. As quadratic relationships were atempted to be tested, an OLS model was 
selected for its ability to model such relations. 
In  al OLS  models, the  dependent  variable  was the  natural logarithm  of  puls 
merged. Al variables were first explored for bivariate corelations and a corelation matrix 
was  produced.  Curve  Fits  were then  explored  using the  Curve  Fit function  on  SPSS, 
where testing was for linear, quadratic and exponential relationships. If the p value was 
<0.05, then that type of relationship was significant. 
In Model I, control variables were examined in order to establish a baseline and 
measure subsequent explanatory power, from the change in the adjusted R2 values. This 
included the rating (RATINGICO), duration (DURATION), whether or not a minimaly 
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viable  product  was  developed  at time  of  campaign launch (MVP),  a  hardcap 
(HARDCAP)  and  softcap  was implemented (SOFTCAP), the  number  of restricted 
countries (NRESTRICTED),  and  variables relating to the  disclosed  base  country, if 
needed (HDI, DEMRANK, OECD). 
N9:0=	A:	%B(!E=3N0180:)$=	P%+)Q P&G94519=I71D7;=03&R+S$ 
In the second to fifth model, ownership structure was examined. In Model I, the 
dependent  variables included  al the  control  variables in  addition to the  percentage  of 
whales (PWHALE)  and its  squared term (PWHALESQ),  which  colectively represent 
ownership  concentration. For  Model II, the  control  variables  and the  variable for 
institutional  ownership (INST)  were regressed. In  Model IV, the  percentage  of tokens 
distributed (PDIST)  and its  squared term (PDISTSQ)  were tested  along  with  control 
variables. In each model, the change in the Adjusted R2 values compared to Model I were 
noted. In  Model  V,  al  variables  of  ownership  structure, including those representing 
ownership concentration (PWHALE, PWHALESQ), institutional ownership (INST) and 
the percentage of tokens distributed (PDIST) were entered along with control variables 
to observe change in adjusted R2 compared to control variables to reflect total explanatory 
























To  examine  board  structure, the  number  of  advisors (NADVISOR)  and 
percentage of technical advisors (PTECHADVISOR) were in entered in Model VI along 
with control variables in Model I. The diference in Adjusted R2 value compared to Model 
I, which consists only of controls, would reflect the explanatory power of board structure 









In  Model  VI,  variables for  both  ownership  structure  and  board  structure  were 
regressed  among  controls,  against the  natural logarithm  of  puls  merged.  This  model 
thereby  alows  both to  be  combined  and,  by  analyzing the  standardized  coefecients, 
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understand which variables remain significant and to what degree. Very litle research to 
date  has  not  completed  a  model  accounting for  both,  ownership  structure  and  board 















For reliability, stepwise regressions using backward elimination of the variables of 
least significance (0<p<0.05) were also conducted. Stepwise regressions enter variables 
one  at  a time  and  stop  once  al  variables  were tested  with  a  model  of  only  significant 
variables. While they are likely similar as the ones done using the “enter” method, some 
interesting  conclusions  can  nonetheless  be  drawn.  This is  because  sometimes 
coeficients increase  as  a result  of taking insignificant  variables  out,  and  adjusted  R2 
values  may  also increase.  Hence,  Models  VII to  XIV repeat  Models I to  VI  using the 
stepwise method. 
Zero-inflated poisson distributions have been used in other studies, however, are 
problematic for interpreting  marginal  efects  of  quadratics.  Nonetheless, to  verify the 
findings in OLS, a zero-inflated poisson distribution was ran in Stata, given its wide use 
among  studies  of innovation  outcomes,  such  as  patents,  which  do  not test  quadratic 
functions. Al independent and control variables were tested against the raw number of 
                                                            Page  | 82 
pul requests merged. This type of model looks at each event, in this case, pul request 
merged, as independent from others even if within the same token. 
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3.8. Tables  
 
Table 3.1: Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Innovation Output 
PULLSMERGED Number of Pul Requests 
Merged. 
Github (Main Repository) 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Ownership Concentration 
PWHALE Percent owned by Whales. Etherscan.io 
PWHALESQ PWhale2 to test quadratic. Transformed variable 
INST Number of Institutional 
Investors. 
CryptoFundResearch 
PDIST Percent of the coins 
distributed in the initial coin 
ofering. 
ICOBench 
PDISTSQ PDist2 to test quadratic. ICOBench 
Board Structure 
NADVISOR Number of advisors. ICOBench/ Whitepapers 
NADVISORSQ NAdvisor2 to test quadratic. ICOBench/ Whitepapers 
PTECHADVISOR Percentage of advisors with a 
technical degree, measured 
by the number of advisors 
with a technical degree, 




RATINGICO Ratings from ICO experts. ICOBench 
DURATION Length of ICO. ICOBench 
COUNTDISC 1 or 0, for weather or not they 
record if the country has 
been disclosed. 
ICOBench 
MVP 1 or 0, for weather or not they 
have a minimaly viable 
product. 
ICOBench 
HARDCAP 1 or 0, for weather or not they 
have a hard cap on funds. 
ICOBench 
SOFTCAP 1 or 0, for weather or not they 
have a hard cap on funds. 
ICOBench 
NRESTRICTED Count number of countries 
the UTO is restricted. 
ICOBench 
HDI Score from 0-10 on human 
development. 
United Nations Development 
Programme 
DEMRANK Score from 0-10 on level of 
democratic institutions. 
Economist Inteligence Unit 
OECD 1 or 0, for weather or not their 
disclosed country of is a 
member of the OECD. 
OECD 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
PWhale 0.00% 100.00% 79.9245% .2504855 
INST 0.00 30 .38 2.282 
PDist 3.00% 100.00% 54.8329% .1928825 
NAdvisor 0.00% 19 6.07 3.665 
PTechAdv 0.00% 100.00% .28534325
6985451 
.262251687796025 
PulsMerged 0.00 1549 23.64 118.043 
Hardcap 0.00 1 .57 .495 
Bonus 0.00 1 .62 .485 
MVP 0.00 1 .46 .499 
Softcap 0.00 1 .26 .437 
Duration 0.00 615 69.34 79.004 
RatingICO 1.5 4.7 3.681 .5143 
CountDisc 0.00 1 .29 .454 
NRestricted 0.00 46 1.12 3.502 
HDI .000 .954 .87471 .114647 
DemRank 1.08 9.87 7.1895 1.77609 
OECD 0 1 .53 .500 
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Table 3.3: Puls Merged by Base Country of ICO 






Argentina 1 99.99% 0 1 0.00% 0 
Australia 15 89.69% 0 5.33 31.87% 0.23104906 
Austria 4 63.90% 0 6.25 38.06% 1.1358237 
Bahamas 1 48.43% 0 9 66.67% 3.52636052 
Belarus 1 45.35% 0 5 20.00% 0 
Belize 8 87.29% 0 5 24.03% 0.83176907 
Bermuda 2 93.05% 0 10 20.20% 0 
Brazil 4 69.59% 0 5.25 45.14% 0.40235948 
Bulgaria 2 90.79% 0 9 44.44% 0 
Canada 8 78.16% 2.13 7.25 29.01% 0.63594954 
Cayman 
Island 
23 76.77% 0.17 7 
17.78% 
0.22161022 
China 3 84.94% 6 5 38.41% 2.13341915 
Colombia 1 80.13% 0 10 50.00% 0 
Costa Rica 2 99.88% 0 1 100.00% 1.94591015 
Croatia 1 69.46% 0 3 0.00% 0 
Cyprus 6 89.20% 0 4 27.50% 0.67384188 
Czech 
Republic 
3 93.67% 0 4.33 
26.67% 
0 
Denmark 2 98.47% 0 7 31.11% 0 
Ecuador 1 99.18% 0 0 0.00% 1.09861229 
Egypt 1 88.01% 0 5 20.00% 0 
Estonia 37 82.81% 0.03 6.49 24.40% 0.40739834 
France 10 64.97% 0 5.7 38.36% 1.35864294 
Georgia 3 63.18% 0 3.67 24.44% 0 
Germany 13 86.91% 0 5.54 23.42% 0.10663803 
Gibralter 9 62.26% 0.11 6.78 29.84% 0.75729333 
Hong Kong 16 88.41% 0.12 6.56 22.46% .1903 
India 10 89.23% 0.1 5 16.78% 0.62614917 
Indonesia 2 99.74% 0 8.5 28.57% 0.34657359 
Ireland 4 95.40% 0 9.75 46.73% 0.1732868 
Isle of Man 1 98.41% 0 3 0.00% 0 
Israel 5 86.94% 0.2 3.8 40.00% 1.73034482 
Italy 1 99.80% 0 3 0.00% 0 
Latvia 3 73.48% 0 4.33 26.67% 0 
Liechtenstein 3 71.66% 0.67 6.33 27.41% 0 
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Malaysia 2 87.92% 0 6.5 11.11% 0 
Malta 10 63.19% 0.1 6.9 35.65% 1.25277938 
Marhsal 
Islands 
2 84.88% 0 4.5 
6.25% 
0 
Mauritius 1 97.88% 0 12 25.00% 0 
Mexico 3 81.20% 0 4.67 49.49% 0.3662041 
Netherlands 9 86.75% 0 6.33 18.09% 0.32715989 
New Zealand 1 96.17% 0 8 25.00% 0 
Nigeria 5 79.41% 0 6.6 21.22% 0.13862944 
None 3 97.54% 0 3.67 9.52% 0 
North Korea 1 95.20% 0 10 50.00% 0 
Norway 2 48.19% 0 7.5 29.17% 0 
Panama 2 97.77% 0 3 16.67% 0 
Philippines 1 96.30% 0 5 40.00% 0 
Poland 2 63.38% 0 3 0.00% 0 
Portugal 1 95.64% 0 5 40.00% 0 
Romania 4 83.82% 0 4.75 25.56% 0.1732868 
Russia 30 85.90% 0.3 6.8 27.21% 0.31745634 
Saint Kits 1 76.42% 0 4 0.00% 0 
Saint Kits 1 99.65% 0 10 40.00% 0 
Samoa 1 82.39% 0 4 0.00% 0 
Serbia 3 97.64% 0 7 27.50% 0 
Seycheles 5 91.11% 0 4.6 15.39% 0.49698133 
Singapore 62 80.76% 0.38 6.05 31.82% 0.74860552 
Slovenia 5 74.28% 0 6.4 33.72% 0.84969905 
South Africa 2 86.57% 0 2 0.00% 0 
Spain 3 47.01% 0.67 4.33 31.75% 4.08727947 
Switzerland 24 69.58% 0.83 6.17 38.44% 1.54013337 
Taiwan 1 70.70% 1 3 100.00% 1.60943791 
Turkey 2 53.27% 0 4.5 22.50% 0 
UAE 9 72.48% 0 8.33 25.09% 0.39181784 
UK 48 77.75% 0.1 5.37 24.83% 0.63216844 
Ukraine 2 98.53% 0 5 20.00% 0 
USA 56 78.08% 1.5 6.52 32.81% 1.29425308 
Venezuela 1 91.77% 0 7 28.57% 0 
Virgin Island 9 66.53% 0.56 5.89 31.30% 0.71654327 
Total 525 79.92% 0.38 6.07 28.53% 0.68686907 
Notes: 
LN(PulsMerged) = Natural Logarithm of PulsMerged. 
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Table 3.4: Puls Merged by Industry of ICO 
 







Total 525 79.92% 0.38 6.07 28.53% 0.68686907 
Art 7 89.81% 0.14 4.43 19.59% 0.48104226 
Artificial 
Inteligence 
35 83.03% 0.03 6.09 
26.85% 
0.1233568 
Banking 22 81.21% 1.36 6.45 29.61% 0.25740729 
Big Data 17 71.83% 0.06 6 39.84% 0.68086899 
Business 
services 





7 74.83% 0 4.43 
19.84% 
0.74025479 
Charity 2 100.00% 0 3.5 12.50% 0 
Communication 16 84.16% 0.37 6.56 34.60% 0.61946598 
Cryptocurency 74 82.68% 0.22 5.54 28.96% 0.79069903 
Education 5 64.57% 0 3.4 33.71% 0.60890449 
Electronics 3 85.80% 0 6.33 19.39% 0 
Energy 2 68.46% 0 8 42.06% 0 
Entertainment 24 76.46% 0.04 6 38.78% 0.88690553 
Health 10 81.04% 0 7.8 33.73% 0 
Infrastructure 14 76.18% 2.07 7.21 33.57% 1.62692334 
Internet 12 82.12% 0.08 6.33 34.38% 1.42046245 
Investment 27 87.44% 0.04 6.11 20.86% 0.23302108 
Legal 4 71.39% 0.25 9.25 19.08% 0 
Manufacturing 5 91.36% 0 5.6 14.47% 0 
Media 11 92.16% 0.18 6.64 27.80% 0.9825555 
Other 12 87.19% 0.08 5.17 48.01% 1.42127805 
Platform 114 75.76% 0.65 5.63 25.09% 0.8054689 
Real estate 12 75.39% 0 6.42 21.88% 0.26483782 
Retail 9 87.21% 0 3.78 19.07% 0.62608773 
Smart Contract 11 83.07% 0.55 7.18 22.30% 0.6814129 
Software 9 73.63% 0.89 9 30.83% 1.41904294 
Sports 2 84.81% 0 5 25.00% 2.99448071 
Tourism 5 66.78% 0 5 20.00% 1.19220107 
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Chapter 4: Hypothesis Development 
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The first  proposition  suggests that  ownership  concentration  and innovation 
outcomes  would  be related to  each  other in the  shape  of  an inverse  U. While extant 
literature is relatively limited  and  split  between finding  positive  and  negative results 
between such and innovation, most empirical studies nonetheless support a significant 
relationship (Balsmeir,  Buchwald  and  Stiebale,  2014).  Those finding  a  positive 
relationship suggest they are concerned with the market value of the firm to atract further 
shareholders (Beloc, 2012), while most finding a negative relationship suggest that, as 
ownership  concentration increases,  so too  does the  opportunity for large  owners to 
become opportunistic and coordinate activities that can maximize short-term profit (Su, 
Xu and Phan, 2008). Given these studies are constrained by examining the phenomena 
with  data  subject to  national-level institutions,  such  structures  may influence the 
relationship to be more on one side of the U.  
Some  news  services  of  utility tokens  suggest “few  people realize just  how 
concentrated [token]  ownership is” (Finestone,  2018),  with  a  smal  set  of  addresses 
apparently controling upwards of 90% of a token’s value. Addresses are made for each 
walet and are made public, so some investors may have multiple addresses, or some 
may  be  a  smal  group  of inventors,  however,  nonetheless is  a  strong  measure  of 
ownership concentration. As tokens do not report revenues per-se, prices of tokens are 
made public. As some investors buy tokens to finance their development with the aim of 
seling them to end users for their utility value on exchanges, they want their sales price 
of tokens to  be  as  high  as  possible and  hence  concentration  of  ownership  may  be  an 
important  perspective.  In  UTOs,  ownership  concentration  has  not  been  explored 
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academicaly, however, drawing on literature of innovation and governance in traditional 
firms, arguments can be made for its behavior. 
To  a  particular  point,  ownership  concentration  can  be  argued to  enhance 
innovation as these owners are looking to atract further investors which wil increase the 
token  value;  however,  at  higher levels  of  concentration, this  efect  could  weaken  and 
become  negative  due to  entrenchment.  Literature  suggests  entrenchment  by large 
owners can only be possible with ability and wilingness (De Massis, Kotlar, Chua and 
Chrisman, 2014). Accordingly, this would be near or around 50% concentration, as this 
gives agency to the large owners and, should they be wiling to coordinate moves, can 
then  put resources towards  maximizing their  private  and immediate  benefit, instead  of 
towards long-term innovation projects. Most large investors to tokens are known to each 
other and sometimes actively coordinate activities, such as when a large holder unloads 
their coins and the public is left to absorb the sel orders, known as a “pump-and-dump” 
(Li, Shin and Wang, 2019). 
H1: The percentage of tokens owned by whales wil be related in an inverse-
U shape with the natural logarithm of puls merged. 
Institutional ownership on post-ICO performance and found a positive relationship 
while testing for multicolinearity (Fisch and Momtaz, 2020). While not yet tested against 
technological  development in the  context  of  utility tokens, Proposition  2  suggests 
institutional investors from venture capital funds, could provide necessary building blocks 
for long-term incentives of innovation. As most institutional owners of utility tokens are 
from venture funds and hedge funds, it is estimated that the relationship wil be positive. 
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H2: Institutional ownership wil positively relate to the natural logarithm of 
puls merged. 
The percentage of tokens distributed to the public market has been afiliated with 
financial  performance, listing  status  and technological  development.  As tokens  not 
distributed are retained by the founding team, they can be used for a variety of purposes 
including rewarding the technical team, investor marketing, and rewards for the founders. 
In  some  may, this  may resemble  management  ownership.  Literature in  management 
ownership suggests relates with innovation either in a positive or negative way. This may 
suggest that the percentage of tokens distributed may, not necessarily positively corelate 
positively as found in previous literature, but may do so within the shape of an inverse U. 
H3: The percentage of the token distributed positively relate to the natural 
logarithm of pul requests merged. 
One  of the largest  and  most important  governance  mechanisms is its  board  of 
directors, and hence, a significant body of literature focusses on such and its relationship 
to innovation.  Proposition  3  suggests  advisory  boards  wil  have  similar impacts  on 
innovation as boards of directors, as despite not carying judiciary, they are both involved 
in providing external advice to the strategy process. Further, it was also suggested that 
the proportion of technical directors would account for more variance than board size. 
H4a: The percentage of advisors of a utility token that come from a technical 
background  wil  have  a  positive impact  on the  natural logarithm  of  puls 
merged. 
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H4b: The  size  of  a  utility token’s  advisory  board  wil  have  a  negative 
relationship on the natural logarithm of puls merged. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
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5.1 Bivariate Analysis 
To examine bivariate corelations, a Pearson corelation matrix was run on each 
of the raw independent variables colected and the dependent variable, being the natural 
logarithm  of  pul requests  merged (Table  5.1). It reveals the  natural logarithm  of  puls 
merged is significantly and positively related to the percent of the percentage of whales 
(PWHALE),  number  of institutional  owners (INST),  percent  of technical  advisors 
(PTECHADVISOR), and the ranking of democracy for their base country (DEMRANK); 
and significantly and negatively related to the provision of a bonus for volume purchases 
(BONUS),  development  of  a  minimaly  viable  product (MVP),  and the  duration  of the 
campaign (DURATION).  The  strongest  corelation is  with the  percent  of technical 
advisors (.437) and institutional ownership (.334). 
5.2. Ownership Structure and Innovation Outcome 
Model I (Table  5.2)  shows  a linear regression  with the  dependent  variable  of 
interest being the natural logarithm of puls merged, and the independent variables being 
controls. It finds that approximately one-eighth of the variance in the dependent variable 
can be explained by the controls. In particular, the significant positive control was whether 
or  not the token  discloses the  country to  which it is  based (COUNTDISC)  and is 
negatively related to the provision of a volume discount (BONUS), ofering a minimaly 
viable  product  within the ICO  stage (MVP)  and the  duration  of the  campaign 
(DURATION). The stepwise regression, in Model VII (Table 5.6) which regresses the 
same  control  variables  against the  same  dependent  variable  suggested  some  similar 
results, with MVP, DURATION, and BONUS having similar efects and accounting for 
approximately  11  percent  of the  variance.  While COUNTDISC  was  not  a  significant 
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variable, whether or not the base country had OECD membership was significant as was 
the rating of the ICO (RATINGICO). 
To  examine  whether  or  not the  percent  of token  supply  owned  by  whales 
(PWHALE)  was related to the  natural logarithm  of  puls  merged  was  either linear  or 
quadratic format, a curve fit test was conducted (Figure 5.1). In this model, a negative 
linear relationship was significant (p <.001) and accounts for approximately 3.6% of the 
variance in the natural logarithm of puls merged (Adj. R2 = 0.036). Further, a quadratic 
relationship was also found significant (p <.001) and accounts for more variance than the 
linear relationship at 11.2% (Adj. R2 = 0.112). Accordingly, both the raw number of the 
percentage  owned  by  whales for  each token (PWHALE),  was tested for  a linear 
relationship and its squared term (PWAHLESQ) was tested for a quadratic relationship. 
Model I (Table  5.3) introduces PWHALE and PWHALESQ  as  a  measure  of 
ownership concentration to the model. From this model, it appears that PWHALE and 
the and PWHALESQ have significant positive corelates (p<.001). This infers an inverse-
U relationship between concentration of tokens held by whales and the natural logarithm 
of puls merged. DURATION and MVP remained significant controls, infering those with 
longer campaigns and entering with a minimaly viable product already developed merge 
a smaler number of pul requests. Altogether, the model then explains 15.6% of the total 
variance, marking an increase of 6% from the control variables. Very similar efects are 
found  when  conducted in  Stepwise format,  as  shown in  Model IX (Table  5.7)  with the 
same  controls  being  significant,  similar  coeficients  on  al  variables  and  a  similar 
marginalized explanation of variance. 
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Model II (Table 5.3) examines the impact of the number of institutional investors 
(INST), with the set of control variables, on the natural logarithm of pul requests merged. 
It finds  a  significant  and  positive relationship  with INST (p<.001)  which infers that the 
number  of institutional investors  has  a  positive relationship  with the  number  of these 
investors. Furthermore, INST also has the greatest standardized coeficient in the model. 
Similar efects, with respect to a positive, and significant relationship was observed under 
the stepwise regression method, in Model X (Table 5.7), with institutional ownership also 
having the  strongest  standardized  coefecient.  The  significant  control  variables  were 
diferent under stepwise than the enter method. In the enter method, significant controls 
MVP, DURATION and RATINGICO, which were similar as those under Model I, while 
those in the  stepwise  Model  X, MVP,  DURATION and DEMRANK  were  significant 
which was similar to what was found in stepwise Model IX. The diference from the control 
models  were  8.6%  and  7.8% for the  Model II  and  Model  X respectively,  showing 
approximately  similar results  between  both  models.  Altogether, this indicates that the 
number of institutional investors is positively related and strongly related to the natural 
logarithm of pul requests merged. 
In Model IV (Table 5.3), the dependent variables of interest were the percentage 
of the token supply distributed to the public and its squared term. In this regression, the 
only variables of interest were control variables identified in Model I (Table 5.1), meaning 
PDIST nor its squared term were significant. The same findings were found within the 
stepwise  method  of  Model  XI (Table  5.7)  with the  only  significant  variables  being the 
control  variables identified in  Model  VII (Table  5.6).  Thus,  unlike its relations the 
percentage of the token supply distributed in the ICO was not a significant variable on the 
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natural logarithm of puls merged. Accordingly, both Model IV and Model XI showed no 
change in the explanatory power from the control models.  
Model V (Table 5.3) modeled al measures of ownership concentration against the 
dependent  variable,  which thereby regressed PWHALE,  PWHALESQ,  PDIST, 
PDISTSQ, and INST on the natural logarithm of puls merged. In this model, PDIST and 
PDISTSQ remained insignificant.  The  standardized  coeficients for PWHALE, 
PWHALESQ, and INST were similar to when they were regressed independently, and 
accounts for 14.8% additional explanatory power on the natural logarithm of puls merged. 
Similarly, Model XI (Table 5.7), PDIST and PDISTSQ were insignificant and others had 
similar  standardized  coeficients,  and in the  stepwise  model,  accounts for  slightly less 
variance more than the control variables at 13.8%. 
5.3. Board Structure and Innovation Outcomes 
Board Structure in Model VI (Table 5.4), and the stepwise Model XI (Table 5.8) 
were  modeled  with the  dependent  variables  of interest  being the  number  of  advisors 
(NADVISOR), its squared value (NADVISORSQ), the percentage of technical advisors 
(PTECHADVISOR) and its squared value (PTECHSQ) with control variables, against 
the natural logarithm of puls merged. In this model, NADVISOR, NADVISORSQ and 
PTECHADVISOR were found as significant, with PTECHADVISOR accounting with the 
greatest  standardized  coeficient. The  U-shape infers that  at low  size, innovation 
outcomes are fostered as there is likely litle debate on technical direction and at very 
large sizes, there are enough individuals to mediate conflict; however, within the mid-size 
boards sufer from a lack of consensus. However, if this relationship were to be modeled, 
                                                            Page  | 98 
the relationship appears generaly negative, and as reflected in standardized coeficients, 
the linear relationship is stronger than the U relationship in terms of its explained variance. 
The  standardized  coeficients  are  strongest for the technical intensity. The 
additional variance this model accounted for, over controls, was 19.7%. Similar results 
were found when conducted in the Stepwise method within Model VI (Table 5.8) with a 
change in control variables were 19.6% which speaks to the validity of these results. In 
both models, the standardized coeficient for PTECHADVISOR was stronger than that 
of size. Also, in both models, the linear relationship between the natural logarithm of puls 
merged was negatively related to the size of the advisory board. 
5.4. Internal Governance and Innovation Outcomes 
Model  VI (Table  5.5)  and  stepwise  Model  XIV (Table  5.9)  models internal 
governance  on the  natural logarithm  of  pul requests  merged,  where  al  variables  of 
interest were entered. From the results, PWHALE, PWHALESQ, INST, NADVISOR, 
NADVISORSQ and PTECHADVISOR were found as significant. The same results can 
be found using the stepwise method within Model VI (Table 5.5) and Model XIV (Table 
5.9). The final results suggest, therefore, that ownership structure and board structure are 
important  concepts towards  a  utility token’s innovation  output in terms  of the  natural 
logarithm of puls requests merged. In particular, it reveals that concentration of whales 
is related in the shape of an inverse-U, that the number of institutional investors positively 
relates to innovation, that the number of advisors is U-shaped, though mostly negative 
considering  the  mean  and  standard  deviation  of  most  advisory  boards in the tokens 
studied and that the technical intensity of advisors maters strongly for innovation within 
a token.  Total  variance  explained  by internal  governance  mechanisms  was  27.9% 
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according to the  enter  model (Model  VI  Adj.  R2  above  controls  = .279)  and  28.1% in 
stepwise, (Model XIV Adj. R2 above controls = .281) infering approximately 28% of the 
variance. An additional 10% in both cases were explained by the control variables used. 
A zero-inflated poison distribution was executed as Model XV (Table 5.10.1), with 
the dependent variable being the number of pul requests merged and al independent 
and  control  variables included.  Al  variables included  were  significant.  McFadden’s 
Adjusted R2 of .448 (Table 5.10.2) suggests the model explains 44.8% of the variance in 
the raw number of puls merged. The zero-inflated poison model is useful, as it assumes 
each pul request merged, irespective if the firm has merged a pul request before, is an 
independent event. While this model is useful for that reason, it is limited in its ability to 
show  quadratic relationships  and  hence is to  be interpreted  as  a  supporting  model, in 
consultation with the ordinary least squares models otherwise presented. 
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5.5. Tables 
 
Table 5.1: Corelation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. PWHALE 1                 





1               
4. NADVISOR -0.08 -0.033 -0.014 1              
5. 
PTECHADVISOR 
-.109* .156** -.107* .436** 1             
6. HARDCAP 0.058 -0.034 0.025 0.065 0.045 1            
7. BONUS .089* -
.120** 
.089* -0.029 -0.058 .087* 1           
8. MVP .148** -0.053 -0.029 0.027 -.151** .110* .125** 1          
9. SOFTCAP -0.011 0 -0.047 -.086* -0.083 -
.629** 
-0.012 -0.028 1         
10. DURATION .133** -.109* 0.076 -0.024 -.099* .120** .102* .240** -
0.082 
1        
11. RATINGICO 0.01 0.018 -.108* .138** 0.038 0.071 .086* .406** -
0.006 
0.074 1       
12. COUNTDISC .115** -0.023 -0.036 0.063 0.011 -0.027 -0.043 .092* -0.01 0.057 0.048 1      
13. 
NRESTRICTED 






1     




0.06 0.073 0.044 1    
15. DEMRANK -0.083 0.002 -.092* -0.007 0.048 0.041 -0.014 0.018 0.022 -
0.009 
.097* 0.041 0.029 .386** 1   
16. OECD -0.051 0.054 -0.034 -0.016 0.048 0.075 -0.003 0.006 -
0.008 
0.057 0.048 0.001 -0.043 .324** .653** 1  
17. PULLS 











** Corelation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Corelation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5.2: Linear Regression of Control Variables on Pul Requests Merged 
 





HARDCAP 0.006 0.002 
BONUS -0.318* -0.101* 
MVP -0.694*** -0.227*** 
SOFTCAP -0.111 -0.032 
DURATION -0.003*** -0.167*** 
RATINGICO 0.303 0.102 
PREICO -0.066 -0.019 
COUNTDISC 0.177* 0.053* 
NRESTRICTED -0.001 -0.003 
HDI 0.566 0.043 
DEMRANK 0.023 0.027 
OECD 0.163 0.054 





Adjusted R2 .096 
 





***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Table 5.3: Linear Regressions of Ownership Structure on Pul Requests Merged 
 

































HARDCAP 0.074 0.024 0.041 0.013 -0.001 0 0.106 0.034 
BONUS -0.252 -0.08 -0.224 -0.071 -0.307* -0.098* -0.149 -0.047 
MVP -0.57*** -0.186*** -0.67*** -0.219*** -0.695*** -0.227*** -0.541*** -0.177*** 
SOFTCAP -0.081 -0.023 -0.088 -0.025 -0.126 -0.036 -0.071 -0.02 
DURATION -0.002** -0.122** -0.003*** -0.136*** -0.003 -0.163 -0.002 -0.087 
RATINGICO 0.186 0.063 0.252** 0.085** 0.284* 0.096* 0.114 0.038 
PREICO 0.008 0.002 0.039 0.012 -0.065 -0.019 0.117 0.035 
COUNTDISC 0.229 0.068 0.205 0.061 0.17 0.051 0.261* 0.078* 
NRESTRICTED -0.001 -0.002 -0.019 -0.043 -0.003 -0.007 -0.019 -0.044 
HDI 0.245 0.018 0.432 0.032 0.544 0.041 0.072 0.005 
DEMRANK 0.022 0.026 0.044 0.051 0.018 0.022 0.036 0.042 
OECD 0.107 0.035 0.068 0.022 0.168 0.055 0.018 0.006 
PWHALE 4.046*** 0.724*** 
    
4.116*** 0.684*** 
PWHALESQ -4.431*** -0.894*** 








    
0.002 0.023 0.006 0.079 
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PDISTSQ 
    
-0.006 -0.075 -0.009 -0.123 
MODEL STATISTICS 












































a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
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Table 5.4: Linear Regressions of Board Structure on Pul Requests Merged 
 
Model VI Unstandardized Coeficients Standardized 
Coeficients 
(Constant) -0.371  
HARDCAP 0 0 
BONUS -0.268* -0.085* 
MVP -0.457*** -0.149*** 
SOFTCAP -0.035 -0.01 
DURATION -0.003*** -0.13*** 
RATINGICO 0.269* 0.091* 
PREICO -0.016 -0.005 
COUNTDISC 0.187 0.056 
NRESTRICTED -0.008 -0.018 
HDI 0.673 0.051 
DEMRANK 0.003 0.004 
OECD 0.114 0.038 
NADVISOR -0.236*** -0.567*** 
NADVISORSQ 0.01** 0.354** 
PTECHADV 2.932*** 0.504*** 
PTECHSQ -0.006 -0.001 
   
MODEL STATISTICS   
R 0.561  
R2 0.315  
Adjusted R2 0.293  
Δ from Control 0.197  
F Statistic 14.582***  
 
Notes: 
a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
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Table 5.5: Linear Regression of Internal Governance on Pul Requests Merged 






HARDCAP 0.085 0.027 
BONUS -0.143 -0.045 
MVP -0.382** -0.125** 
SOFTCAP -0.004 -0.001 
DURATION -0.001* -0.076* 
RATINGICO 0.147 0.05 
PREICO 0.116 0.034 
COUNTDISC 0.257* 0.077* 
NRESTRICTED -0.02 -0.046 
HDI 0.28 0.021 
DEMRANK 0.019 0.022 
OECD 0.014 0.005 
NADVISOR -0.208*** -0.501*** 
NADVISORSQ 0.01** 0.338** 
PTECHADV 2.27** 0.39** 
PTECHSQ 0.211 0.029 
PWHALE 2.882*** 0.473*** 
PWHALESQ -3.094*** -0.624*** 
INST 0.161*** 0.241*** 
PDIST 0 -0.006 
PDISTSQ 0 -0.001  
 
 
MODEL STATISTICS   
R 0.632  
R2 0.4  
Adjusted R2 0.375  
Δ from Control 0.279  
F Statistic 15.94***  
 
Notes: 
a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
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Table 5.6: Stepwise Regression of Control Variables on Pul Requests Merged 
 
 







MVP -0.226*** -4.834*** 
DURATION -0.162*** -3.772*** 
BONUS -0.105* -2.505* 
RATINGICO 0.106* 2.327* 
OECD 0.086* 2.062* 
   





Adjusted R2 0.1 
 





a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
c. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05  
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PWHALESQ -4.812*** -0.972*** 
    
-4.545*** -0.917*** 
MVP 0.048*** 0.791*** -0.573***- -0.187***- 0.691*** 0.226*** -0.475*** -0.155*** 
PWHALE 4.818*** -0.158*** 
    
4.435*** 0.723*** 
DURATION -0.002** -0.118** -0.003** -0.135*** -0.003*** -0.162** -0.002* 0.090* 
BONUS 
  


















    
COUNTDISC 
      
0.274* 0.082* 
         











































a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
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c. Independent Variables: 
a. Model IX: PWHALE, PWHALESQ 
b. Model X: INST 
c. Model XI: PDIST, PDISTSQ 
d. Model XI: PWHALE, PWHALESQ, INST, PDIST, PDISTSQ 
d. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05  
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Table 5.8: Stepwise Regression of Board Quality on Pul Requests Merged 
 






DURATION -0.002** -0.123** 
MVP -0.454*** -0.149*** 
NADVISOR -0.234*** -0.563*** 
PTECHADV 2.951*** 0.508*** 
NADVISORSQ 0.01*** 0.353*** 
RATINGICO 0.285* 0.096* 
BONUS -0.275* -0.087* 
   





Adjusted R2 0.296 
 
Δ from Control 0.196 
 




a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
c. Independent Variables: PTECHADV, PTECHADVSQ, NADVISOR, NADVISORSQ 
d. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05  
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Table 5.9: Stepwise Regression of Internal Governance on Pul Requests Merged 
 






INST 0.162*** 0.243*** 
PWHALESQ -3.318*** -0.669*** 
PWHALE 3.114*** 0.512*** 
MVP -0.312** -0.102** 
NADVISOR -0.213*** -0.512*** 
NADVISORSQ 0.01*** 0.353*** 
PTECHADV 2.462*** 0.423*** 
COUNTDISC 0.265* 0.079* 
DURATION -0.001* -0.077* 
   





Adjusted R2 0.381 
 
Δ from Control 0.281 
 




a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: LN(PulsMerged) 
c. Independent Variables: PWHALE, PWHALESQ, INST, PDIST, PDISTSQ, PTECHADV, 
PTECHADVSQ, NADVISOR, NADVISORSQ 
d. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05  
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PWHALE 5.335461 .3046265 17.51 0.000 4.738404 5.932518 
PWHALESQ -4.099716 .227953 -17.98 0.000 -4.546496 -3.652937 
INST .0491966 .0016122 30.51 0.000 .0460367 .0523566 
PDIST 1.360665 .245834 5.53 0.000 .8788395 1.842491 
PDISTSQ -.6951615 .2464536 -2.82 0.005 -1.178202 -.2121214 
NADVISOR .0909694 .0092945 9.79 0.000 .0727525 .1091864 
NADVISORSQ -.0021521 .0004459 -4.83 0.000 -.0030261 -.0012782 
PERCENTTECHADV 2.66242 .1986181 13.40 0.000 2.273136 3.051704 
PTECHSQ -.9492886 .1742239 -5.45 0.000 -1.290761 -.6078159 
HARDCAP .3724056 .0219034 17.00 0.000 .3294757 .4153356 
MVP -1.383228 .0365132 -37.88 0.000 -1.454792 -1.311663 
SOFTCAP .457188 .0235407 19.42 0.000 .4110491 .503327 
DURATION -.0164531 .0005516 -29.83 0.000 -.0175341 -.015372 
RATINGICO .2353822 .0215453 10.92 0.000 .1931542 .2776103 
COUNTDISC .5880185 .0203921 28.84 0.000 .5480508 .6279862 
_cons .0624277 .1406912 0.44 0.657 -.213322 .3381775 
Inflate       
PulsMerge -49.02951 30301.79 -0.00 0.999 -59439.44 59341.38 
_cons 25.58476 18844.86 0.00 0.999  -36909.65 36960.82 
       
 
Notes: 
a.  N=525 
b. Dependent Variable: PulsMerged 
c. Independent Variables: PWHALE, PWHALESQ, INST, PDIST, PDISTSQ, PTECHADV, 
PTECHADVSQ, NADVISOR, NADVISORSQ 
 
 
Table 5.10.2: Model Statistics for Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression of Pul Requests 
Merged 
Statistic Value 
Log-Lik Intercept Only -17542.409 
Log-Lik Ful Model -9667.511 
D(507) 19335.022 
LR(16) 15749.796 
Prob > LR 0 
McFadden's R2 0.449 
McFadden's Adj R2 0.448 
Maximum Likelihood R2 1 
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5.6. Figures 
 




Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates 
 
R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 
Linear 0.036 19.354 1 523 0 1.606 -0.012 
 
Quadratic 0.112 32.957 2 522 0 0.225 0.054 -0.001 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
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6.1. Introduction 
 The results of this study shed some empirical light on unresolved and previously 
unexamined relationships between internal governance and innovation. Accordingly, the 
results have significant theoretical, managerial and methodological implications. While he 
research was subject to a number of limitations, its findings nonetheless pave the way for 
a fruitful research agenda. 
6.2. Implications 
6.2.1. Theoretical 
The findings of this study extend theory on internal governance mechanisms and 
innovation by  exploring its  conceptual relationship,  and to the  streams  of literature  of 
governance  and innovation in  start-up  business, financial technology  and  emerging 
market  contexts.  As inconclusiveness from  empirical  and theoretical  arguments rests 
upon the contextual setings of the nations studied within research (Gonzales-Bustos and 
Hernandez-Lara, 2016), this paper studies such in the environment of utility tokens, which 
their  use  of  smart  contracts  entails they  are  exposed to  minimal formal institutional 
influence. 
First, its findings  advance research  by  demonstrating that the  conceptual 
relationship between ownership concentration and innovation may be in the shape of an 
inverse U (Table 5.5), given the ability of the utility token environment to beter expose 
conceptual relationships for their lack  of formal  national influence  on  governance. 
Institutional  efects influence  governance  and innovation through their impact  on the 
eficiency of factor markets, accountability and the upholding of the Rule of Law within 
legal national governance and strength of property rights to grant incentives for innovation 
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(Morck and Steier, 2005). Findings from the models show that the percentage owned by 
whales  was related in  an inverse-U  shape  with the  natural logarithm  of  pul requests 
merged, show support for Hypothesis 1. In particular, both linear and quadratic relations 
were significant which, together, account for 6% of the variance in innovation (Model I 
Change in Adjusted R2 from controls = 0.06) Accordingly, the study provides support for 
Proposition  1,  which  was that  ownership  concentration  would  have  an inverse-U 
relationship with innovation outcomes. 
To  model this relationship in the  context  of  utility tokens,  Figure  6.1  shows the 
relation using coeficients from Model VI. Accordingly, the inflection point was identified 
at 47%, suggesting the optimal level of ownership concentration is near the 50% cut-of 
that may alow entrenchment. Research modeling this relationship similarly in the context 
of  China (Chen,  Li,  Shapiro,  and  Zhang,  2014),  where there  are  weak institutions 
influencing governance. 
This suggests that, as with studies finding a positive relation, large owners aim to 
increase the value of their shares by increasing firm value through innovation, to a certain 
point, and then, as studies finding negative relationships suggest, larger owners become 
entrenched and expropriate firm resources for individual benefit. Altogether, results from 
the  examination  of  ownership  concentration  on innovation,  within the  context  of  utility 
tokens,  can  extend theory  by  providing  early  evidence  suggestive  of  an inverse-U 
relationship, as expected by some research, in terms of its conceptual relationship. 
Second, this research  adds to literature  of institutional  ownership  on innovation 
(Kochar and David, 1996; Aghion, van Reenen, and Zinglaes, 2013). In line with research 
showing  contextualy  dependent findings  on institutional investment, again  due to the 
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myriad  of institutions influencing  governance and  ownership identities, this  study 
examines the relationship in  a  unique  seting that  may  beter  expose the  conceptual 
relationship for venture capital and hedge fund investors as the institutions invested in 
utility tokens are exclusively within these categories. Data from the Model IV (Table 5.3) 
shows a positive relationship between the number of institutional investors and the natural 
logarithm  of  puls  merged  which  support Hypothesis  2.  The finding of a  positive 
relationship  between institutional  ownership  by  venture  capital funds  and innovation, 
supports Proposition 2, specificaly that institutional investment from venture capital funds 
are positively related to innovation.  
Third, this study found that what may encourage financial performance may not 
necessarily  encourage innovation  outcomes.  Previous research  on  campaign  success 
and financial  performance,  suggests that the  percentage  of tokens  distributed would 
influence innovation,  supposedly in  a  similar  manner to  managerial  ownership. In  an 
innovation context, founders would be incentivized to innovate with the more stake they 
have in ownership. This paper also examined for potential quadratic efects whereby, after 
a certain point, they can become entrenched. Both variables, explored independently and 
together, reveal  no  significant relationship  on the  natural logarithm  of  pul requests 
merged as shown in Model II (Table 5.3). This infers that Hypothesis 3 is not supported, 
and thereby, advances applied scholarship on initial coin oferings in showing of-chain 
governance mechanisms mater more for innovation. 
Fourth, this study advances the growing body of literature on entrepreneurship and 
start-up governance  (Ingley and McMafrey, 2007; Stromsten and Waluszewski, 2012) 
by conducting a large N sample study on advisory boards, which have surprisingly not 
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been subject to much research in any seting despite growing prominence within smal 
and medium-sized enterprises. Advisory board directors difer from external members of 
boards of directors in that, while being able to advise the business with external advice, 
there is  no fiduciary  duty for  advisors  and  accordingly,  compensation for them is less. 
This research  provides  some  empirical  evidence towards  understanding the  potential 
impact of technical intensity of the board on innovation outcomes. Models suggest that 
there is a strong relationship between the proportion of technical directors and innovation 
(Table 5.5). The model also tested for quadratic relationships, which were not significant. 
The data thereby support Hypothesis 3a for a positive, linear relationship between the 
proportion  of technical  directors  and innovation  outcomes.  This finding  also  supports 
Proposition 3a, which states technical directors are beter able to assist the board with 
providing reliable and trusted insight to assign value to innovation projects and thereby 
make  beter innovation  decisions  with  more  confidence into  what  otherwise  would  be 
unknown. This paves the way for future scholarship on investigating board influence on 
innovation through the proportion of technical directors. 
Fifth,  as  expected in Hypothesis  4b,  accounting for the technical intensity  of 
advisors, the size of advisory board was shown to have an overal negative relationship 
on innovation outcomes (Table 5.5). The supporting data for this hypothesis thereby also 
supports Proposition  3b,  which  draws  on literature  of  boards  of  directors.  Hence, this 
research  shows that  advisory  boards  could  behave  similarly to  boards  of  directors. 
Interestingly, with significance of the quadratic for the number of advisors, very smal and 
very large boards have beter impacts than mid-size boards, extending theory that, while 
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the relationship  may  be  negative  at first, it  may  eventualy  become  positive.  Further 
empirical study of advisory boards is recommended. 
6.2.2. Managerial 
Findings  of this research  provide  a  significant  number  of  managerial implications, 
particularly for boards of directors to firms, investors, regulators in general, in the smal to 
medium size business arena and within the utility token market. 
Boards seeking to grow firms through innovation should be aware of the inverse-U 
relationship of ownership concentration and innovation. Indeed, there are benefits that 
concentrated  ownership  bring to innovation,  namely influence to  growing the firm  and 
ensuring resources  are  put to their  best  use;  however, there  are is  also  a risk  of 
entrenchment that  negatively influences innovation  as the  concentration  approaches 
50%.  Many large  owners  know  one  another  and  can  coordinate  moves to  expropriate 
resources, and with agency, appear to do so. Accordingly, boards should closely examine 
their firms’  ownership  concentration  on  an  ongoing  basis,  and  steer initiatives that 
encourage diversity within ownership structure. Investors should also examine closely the 
ownership structure of the firms they wish to invest within or have holdings therein. As 
innovation is necessary for optimal growth, and should be encouraged, investors looking 
at firms with strong innovation prospects should examine the concentration of ownership 
upon  decisions  with their investments.  This  also  has impacts for regulators,  where 
ownership  concentration  should  not  be limited  per-se,  but instead  designed  such that 
such is promoted until large owners have colective have agency. 
Second, as institutional ownership from venture capital funds was found to positively 
relate to innovation (Table  5.5), this infers that firms  should  actively  seek institutional 
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investment from  venture funds.  As theorized in  proposition  2, these funds  provide for 
strong impacts on innovation for their ability to have patience in their expectations for a 
long-term outcome, with hopes of significant appreciation in a few of their investments. 
Further, it should be understood that institutional ownership is not a unitary concept, as 
diferent identities of institutional investors have diferent impacts on innovation, with that 
from venture funds being positive. This finding could encourage investors to examine the 
specific institutions with investment in the firms they are considering for investment.  
The finding that  advisory  board  size is  generaly  negatively related to innovation 
outcomes, though in the form  of  a  U-shape,  while its technical intensity (Table  5.5) is 
positive is  a  very important finding for  a range  of  stakeholders.  Boards looking to 
maximize innovation within their firms, should thereby place emphasis on the proportion 
of technical directors within its board. Having a large proportion of technical directors on 
boards  would  provide  knowledge resources that  are important in  making innovation 
decisions, for  which  can increase the  confidence  of  others in  commiting to  specific 
innovations. It is  also important  as the  seting  studied  were  advisory  boards,  and  not 
boards of directors. Many start-ups in the high technology sector have advisory boards, 
and this points to important dimensions of how advisory boards should be structured to 
promote innovation, specificaly with a focus on technical intensity and not size per-se. 
Investors looking to  maximize innovation from their investment,  government  programs 
supporting smal and medium sized enterprises and founders looking at maximizing firm 
value, should ensure advisory boards, if in place, are promoted to be structured with a 
large proportion of technical individuals. 
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As the research was done in the seting of utility tokens, it also has a strong number 
of  specific implications for investors, founders  and regulators  within this  space.  This 
research clearly shows that of-chain internal governance, refering to concentration of 
token holders, institutional ownership of tokens and advisory boards, clearly mater. For 
investors  of  utility tokens,  atention to the  concentration  of  whales in tokens  would  be 
important,  where  such is  beneficial  until  a  particular  cut-of  where these  whales  have 
agency  over the token  and  can  coordinate  moves  such  as “pump  and  dump”  scams. 
Founders looking to maximize the innovation outcome of their token should also be aware 
of the impacts  of  ownership  concentration  and institutional  ownership.  The  practical 
implication of most importance to facilitate this, is to not ofer bonuses to investors that 
buy large  volumes  of tokens  or  cut them  of  after  a  specified  amount  of token  supply. 
These  bonuses  act  as  discounts to  volume  buyers  but  can  easily lead to  excessive 
ownership  concentration  as it  promotes large  owners,  which  at  excessive levels, 
negatively relate to innovation. Regulators should also be aware of these implications and 
be encouraged to limit tokens with excessive concentration and inform investors of the 
impacts to such.  
With  positive implications  on innovation from institutional investment (Table  5.5), 
investors  should  consult  data  on institutional  owners  of their investments, if they  are 
planning to invest a substantial amount in a token. As access to the list of institutional 
investments does cost money, but as this study shows, is also a very important dimension 
to innovation, investors should consult this list in their choice of tokens, understanding 
such  promotes innovation  outcomes.  Founders looking to  maximize innovation  should 
actively  seek  ownership from  venture fund institutions, for these  organizations  have 
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capacity to  absorb losses from  unwise investments,  and their relatively longer 
expectations of holding specific tokens alow them to have patience for long-term results 
from innovation. 
Findings related to the advisory board also have a range of implications.  technical 
intensity in  advisory  boards  also  pos  a  number  of  managerial implications for token 
investors, and founders. Founders should aim to structure advisory boards to be smal 
yet with a large proportion of technical advisors. Investors should also examine advisory 
boards carefuly and pay special atention to their technical intensity if innovation is what 
they are concerned with. 
6.2.3. Methodological 
Methodologicaly, this paper advances scholarship through the ability to use utility 
tokens to test relationships that can otherwise not be tested could be done so through the 
seting of initial coin oferings. As national institutions, such as property rights regimes, 
the Rule of Law and democracy efect factor markets, innovation activity, and motivations 
behind investors, relations  on these  concepts  wil likely to  continue to  be  mixed  and 
dependent  upon the  nations to  which they  are  studied.  Initial  coin  oferings  enforce 
contracts  as  smart  contracts through  blockchain technology,  which  eliminates  national 
institutional influence. Initial coin oferings also provide a wealth of relatively accessible 
data on innovation, ownership concentration, institutional ownership and advisory boards 
making them an idylic area to study topics of these concerns. 
6.3. Limitations 
The principal limitation of the findings from this research is its generalizability, as 
the research seting was utility tokens, which may not necessarily be generalizable to a 
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traditional firm context. As utility tokens have significant diferences from traditional firms, 
as discussed throughout the paper, the variables may interact with each other diferently 
in the utility token context than among traditional firms. As the population of utility tokens 
studied also had certain characteristics (see Chapter 3), they are also not generalizable 
to the utility token context. Hence, research should investigate the propositions within this 
study, in other contexts to make findings generalizable. Such context could be a study of 
firms  across  several  countries,  where institutional  characteristics  are  somehow 
controled.  
Second, this research is limited as it concerns itself with only two mechanisms of 
internal governance, being ownership structure and board structure; and one measure of 
innovation, namely innovation outcome. Internal governance can cover a very wide range 
of mechanisms within firms, including ownership structure, board structure, managerial 
incentives, audits, policies and executive compensation and oversight. This paper only 
explored the major two of those. Further, innovation is a largely abstract concept which 
could encompass many activities towards introducing something new, within the view of 
innovation as process, and the physical introduction of something new, with innovation 
as an outcome. This study, in examining the natural logarithm of puls merged, merely 
studies innovation as an outcome. Studies wanting to fuly explore relationships between 
internal  governance  and innovation  should thereby  explore  a  wider  complement  of 
internal  governance  mechanisms  and  examine innovation  activities in the  view  of 
innovation as a process, and not just an outcome.  
Third, the findings from this research  are limited  as the  data  colected  does  not 
alow to indicate causality from governance mechanisms on innovation output. Using OLS 
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was necessary to explore relationships of linear and quadratic nature, this study showed 
that there  are  clear  associations  between internal  governance  mechanisms  and 
innovation,  with  assumptions  made  about the  causation.  To indicate  causation, 
longitudinal studies are recommended where a sample of coins are examined and their 
ownership  concentration, institutional investment,  and  advisory  board  structure  are 
recorded with at multiple diferent times, and corelated to the innovation activity of those 
tokens for that time period. While this is desirable, gathering data for such would be a 
very intensive process and hence likely would examine a considerably smaler sample of 
tokens. Altogether, the limitations suggest that results of this study should be interpreted 
with caution, yet nonetheless paves the way wel for future research. 
6.4. Delimitations 
Several  measures  were taken to  minimize the impact  of the limitations.  To 
minimize the chalenges of studying utility tokens to reveal conceptual relationships, the 
population of tokens was sampled to best capture the concepts of internal governance 
and innovation. By selecting the two most widely used measures of governance and a 
consistent  proxy for innovation  outcomes  across  al tokens  studied in the  sample, it is 
hoped that the study would have explored the most foundational relationships from which 
future studies could build. In understanding the desire to show reasonable relationships, 
this study used a large N sample (N=525) to best unravel relationships not caused by 
fluke and rely on strong theory from other studies to inform its model. 
6.5. Future Research 
This  study  paves the  way for  a  very fruitful,  multi-disciplinary research  agenda 
exploring conceptual relationships between innovation and governance and using utility 
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tokens as an empirical laboratory to model other conceptual relationships. First, future 
scholarship  should  explore  how internal  governance influences financial  performance, 
with its influences on innovation as a mediator. The relationship between governance and 
financial  performance remains inconclusive  with  significant  gaps  on  how the  concepts 
relate. The impacts of internal governance on innovation are surely relevant for investors, 
boards, firms,  policymakers  and regulators.  Similar  studies  exploring  economic  growth 
can also be conducted, as firm governance is thought to be an underexplored mechanism 
of  economic  growth  within  countries.  Both  studies  could  use the  propositions  of 
governance  advanced in this  study,  and further theorize  how these,  and  other 
mechanisms, influence innovation. 
Second, research  could  explore interactions  between  multiple  governance 
mechanisms by exploring mediation and moderations and drawing from strong theory. It 
has been suggested that ownership concentration reduces the negative impact of a large 
bord size due to their abilities to beter coordinate the board and work towards finding 
consensus. However, no empirical studies have examined this, likely due to a very smal 
number of studies exploring more than one governance mechanism against innovation. 
Other  metrics  may investigate  other  mechanisms  such  as institutional  ownership 
influence  board  structures,  which  may include the technical intensity  of  boards  of 
directors, and not necessarily be limited to size. 
Third, further scholarship could further advance a more comprehensive model of 
internal  governance  and innovation.  Board  structure is  a large  concept,  and  many 
variables  were  not included in this  study that  could  be important,  such  as  gender, 
nationality, and diversity of thought. Similarly, there are many other ownership identities 
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than those explored in this study and hence may be helpful in developing a more inclusive 
model. Other internal structural variables that should be studied alongside governance 
for its influence on innovation, could include cultural dimensions, the top management 
team,  disclosure,  and  media reputation.  Utility tokens  can  be  used  as  an  empirical 
laboratory as these additional variables can be reasonably explored and, if fruitful, can be 
explored in a more research-intensive study of traditional firms. It is recommended that 
future studies also consult white papers, which may reveal how distributions of retained 
tokens are divided, and also provide some insight into its relationship to innovation. 
This research also suggests that advisory boards, as prominent features of start-
ups in the technology sector and other private businesses, should be the atention of more 
theory and explored with more empirical data. As discussed in the paper, members of 
advisory boards difer from independent directors on boards, in that only the later have a 
fiduciary  duty  and  are  usualy  compensated  accordingly,  while  both  provide  external 
advice  and resources to the firm, to  direct their innovation  activities.  While the  paper 
discusses the many ways in which advisory boards are similar to boards of directors in 
their influence  on innovation, it is  also  conceivable there  are  many  diferences.  Thus, 
empirical research  and theoretical  work  on  advisory  boards,  and their influence  on 
innovation  and financial  performance,  should  be  considerably  advanced.  Within the 
rapidly growing entrepreneurship literature, (Tang and Zhao, 2016) advisory boards are 
a considerable gap, further underscored by the importance of start-up technology firms 
grows in the  knowledge intensive  economy.  With  a  wide range  of  open  and relatively 
accessible data to advisory boards available for utility tokens, it may be a fruitful laboratory 
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to  explore these  basic relationships  prior to  more intensive  processes  of testing them 
within traditional firm contexts, where national influences may be a strong factor.  
6.6. Conclusion 
Altogether, this study provides data that support important theoretical propositions 
related to internal governance mechanisms and innovation. The empirical findings notably 
suggest that ownership concentration has an inverse-U relationship with innovation, that 
institutional ownership from venture capital firms are positively related to innovation, that 
advisory board size behaves similar to boards of directors and that technical intensity of 
boards  are  stronger than  size.  This  has important implications  on theory,  managerial 
practice and methodology, as discussed. There are several limitations of this research, 
including its  use  of  utility tokens  as  an  empirical  environment, its limited  proxies  of 
mechanisms  of  governance  and innovation  and its lack  of longitudinal  data to further 
indicate causality. Several delimitation initiatives were done to counter these limitations. 
Altogether, the paper provides an excelent platform for future research as studies can 
build from this to ground development of a model exploring governance, innovation and 
financial  performance, further   develop  more  comprehensive  model  of innovation  and 
governance, ground applied national studies on innovation and governance and explore 
diferences and similarities between members of advisory boards and external members 
of boards of directors. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
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  The  primary  goal  of this  study  was to  examine the  conceptual relationships 
between internal organizational governance mechanisms and innovation outcomes, by 
using utility tokens as an empirical laboratory. Given that these tokens are not bound to 
national countries which may influence governance and have a consistent measure of 
innovation  outcomes,  such  was  a  seemingly  natural  seting to  add to the inconclusive 
literature. Secondary goals were to contribute meaningfuly with the context, especialy 
on literature of governance of high-tech SMEs with particular emphasis of the impact of 
advisory  characteristics  on innovation  outcomes,  and  within the  growing literature 
surounding utility token oferings, as a novel method of entrepreneurial finance. 
Drawing on a rigorous review of theoretical basic and applied research, this study 
made a number of propositions on the conceptual relationship between governance and 
innovation for which it found support. First, it found support for ownership concentration 
to have an inverse-U relationship on innovation outcome, which suggests national forces 
moderate the relationship and can explain the relatively split literature. Second, it found 
support for institutional ownership having a positive and linear relationship on innovation 
outcome,  which indicates that institutional investors  help facilitate  coordination  of the 
team  and  keep it  accountable.  Fourth, it found that technical intensity  of the  board 
explained  more  variance than the  size itself,  and  had  a  positive linear relationship  on 
innovation  outcomes.   Lastly, it found  support for  a  U-shape  and  negative linear 
relationship  between  advisory  board  size  and innovation  outcomes,  which folows  one 
stream of literature finding similar results as boards of directors. 
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The results of this study are limited in three major ways. First, as this study used 
utility tokens as its empirical context, the relationships may not be the same for traditional 
firms  and  caution  should  be taken in interpreting the findings.  Second, this research 
defined innovation only on outcome and not as process, hence, there remains a gap for 
examining the  conceptual relationship  with  empirical  data from innovation  processes. 
Further, the research focussed  on two  mechanisms  of internal  governance,  namely 
ownership structure and board structure. Other mechanisms of internal governance exist, 
such as executive compensation and incentives which were not included in this study. 
Third, the research  was  not  structured longitudinaly  and  hence  can  not  support 
causation. Delimitations included focussing on a population best exemplify the conceptual 
relationships,  choosing the two  major  mechanisms  of  governance  and  a  consistent 
measure of innovation as the variables and relying on a large N to make a concrete case 
for relationships which may exist in the data. 
Accordingly, this study paves the way for future research, which can take several 
directions.  First, it remains to  be  known if  governance  efects innovation  and financial 
performance in the same way, that is, if it efects innovation positively, would it also efect 
financial performance. Second, using mixed methods research, identification of national 
institutions that efect governance and operationalizing these could prove fruitful to testing 
the propositions in this study with traditional firms, and atempting to control for national 
influences. Third, further examination into the advisory board would be useful. Advisory 
boards  are  prominent features  of  many  high-tech  start-up firms.  Examining their 
characteristics, both in the UTO context for a conceptual relationship with innovation and 
among firms in  specific  countries for  an  applied  context,  should  be  necessary. 
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Methodologicaly, this study paves the way for using UTOs as an empirical laboratory to 
test relationships where national jurisdictions would otherwise limit so doing. 
By  examining  governance  and innovation  within the  empirical  context  of  utility 
tokens, this research  produced results that  advance theoretical,  managerial  and 
methodological practice on governance and innovation. 
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ICO: Initial Coin Ofering: A way for cryptocurencies to raise funds as they develop 
their new token, which could act as curency, app or service. Public ICOs are similar to 
crowdfunding, where tokens are sold in exchange for a right to use one token. Every 
ICO project may seek funding to launch. 
Token: A cryptographic entity with a value, amount and conditions specified. Tokens 
can be used, like software, to solve problems. For example, if it is a cofeeshop, one 
token may be a cup of cofee. 
Utility token: A token which uses blockchain protocols to solve a problem, like how 
software uses code to solve problems. 
Security token: A token which derives value from an external, tradable asset. 
UTO: Utility Token Ofering: A campaign for the launch of a utility token, which hope 
to fundraise enough funds and sel enough tokens to develop their technology. 
STO: Security Token Ofering: A crowdfunded campaign for the launch of a security 
token. 
Whale: A token owner who owns 1% or more of a token’s total supply. 
MVP: Minimaly viable product. 
Bonus: A volume incentive given to those who purchase many tokens. 
Hardcap: A maximum, or ceiling, on the amount possibly raised by a ICO campaign. 
Softcap: The minimum, or floor, on the amount needed for a campaign to fundraise and 
be deemed successful. 
Address: An address to a distributed ledger, such as how an IP address is associated 
with an internet connection or how a computer has a MAC address. 
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Advisor: An external member who is not formaly apart of a token’s team, that can 
advise one or more tokens on their operations. 
GitHub: An open source platform used to develop open source code. 
Repository: A central storage location of code, that may contain multiple source codes 
used by the program. 
Commit: An individual change or extension to a file. 
Fork: A replicated version of a repository, made separate for testing purposes. 
Pul Request Open: An open request for merger of one or more commits to be puled 
into a repository. 
Pul Request Closed, rejected: An evaluated pul request with the moderator denying 
the pul request, such as if the moderator does not see value of the change or feature to 
be introduced, or finds faults in the code. 
Pul Request Merged: An evaluated pul request with the moderator accepting the 
request and puling into the requested repository. 
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